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U.S.

INTERVENTION IN SYRIA:

A

LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

TO PROTECT?
DANIELA ABRATTt

ABSTRACT

In August 2013, the Syrian government fired roughly fifteen rockets
with a deadly chemical agent onto its streets, killing hundreds and
wounding thousands. After the United States threatened to intervene militarily in Syria, the Syrian government agreed to sign the Chemical
Weapons Convention and destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles. But
Syria violated the terms of the Convention on April 4, 2017, when it
launched another deadly chemical attack on its people. In response, the
United States fired fifty-nine rockets at a Syrian airbase to warn Syria
that its use of chemical weapons would not be tolerated. When the United Nations Security Council is either deadlocked by a veto or simply
unwilling to intervene, what actions can an individual country take to
halt gross violations of human rights? This Article asserts that under the
emerging "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, the United States' missile
strike was legal-and morally required-under international law.
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INTRODUCTION

It was April 4, 2017, and the war in Syria raged on. The sleepy,
rubble-ridden streets of the city of Khan Sheikhoun awoke to face another, day with the hope that maybe, somehow, today would be different.
And it was. As the sun peaked over the bomb-blasted skyline of her rebel-held hometown, a fourteen-year-old girl walked to school and felt her
eyes sting as she saw a "yellow mushroom cloud" erupting from the blast
a few dozen yards away.' She saw people rush out of their cars to help
the wounded, but they collapsed almost immediately.2 They convulsed,
gasped for their last breaths, and died.3 Nearby, a young father clutched
his twin toddlers in his arms and kissed their lifeless bodies goodbye.
It was April 4, 2017-almost four years after the Syrian government
released its first major chemical weapons attack on its people-and
again, accusations of the dropping of a toxic chemical agent spread.5
Shortly after the first rockets hit, a hospital in the region treating the victims was also bombed.6 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) began collecting samples and evidence to determine
whether chemical weapons were in fact used, and if so, what specific
agent was utilized.7 The World Health Organization and Doctors Without
Borders,8 two prominent organizations that have been working on the
ground for several years now, stated that the attack likely involved a
.1.
Anne Barnard & Michael R. Gordon, Worst Chemical Weapons Attack in Years in Syria;
U.S.
Blames
Assad,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/middleeast/syria-gas-attack.html.
2. See id
3. See id.
4. See Sarah El Deeb, A Father Bids Farewell to Twin Toddlers After Syria Attack,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 5,2017), https://www.apnews.com/039901baa62d4486afd2a3054123f7c7.
5. Syria Conflict: 'Chemical Attack' in Idlib Kills 58, BBC (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter
'ChemicalAttack' in Idlib Kills 58], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39488539.
6. Syria 'Chemical Attack' Down to Assad, US Says, BBC (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Down
to Assad], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39493854.
7. See Press Release, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], OPCW
Press Release on Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use in Southern Idlib, Syria (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-press-release-on-allegations-of-chemical-weapons-use-insouthern-idlib-syria.
8. Medicins Sans Frontieres, or Doctors Without Borders, is an international medical humanitarian organization that provides impartial medical assistance in more than sixty countries to people
whose survival is ravaged by natural and manmade disasters. History & Principles, MEDICINS SANS
FRONTIERES, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/about-us/history-principles (last visited Sept.
16, 2017).
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chemical agent, such as sarin, 9 based on the symptoms exhibited by the
victims: choking, paralysis, foaming at the mouth, no external injuries,
and pupils as small as a pinpoint.' 0 It is estimated that at least 92 people
were killed, including 30 children, while hundreds were injured."
The international community immediately pointed the finger at Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad for the attackl2 and blamed his Russian
ally for protecting him.' 3 British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson stated
that the attack "bears all the hallmarks" of the Assad regime and that
Britain "will continue to lead international efforts to hold perpetrators to
account."' 4 Britain appealed to "the Security Council members who have
previously used their vetoes to defend the indefensible" and urged Rubsia
and China not to block any actions sought against the Assad government.1s U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that President Assad
operates "with brutal, unabashed barbarism."' 6 He also criticized Russia
for being either "complicit" or "incompetent" in ensuring the removal of
chemical weapons from Syria.17
Both Syria and Russia shirked responsibility. Russia blamed an airstrike on a rebel-held storage facility allegedly housing the chemical
weapons, but rebel leaders maintained that they lacked the capability and
capacity to produce nerve agents.' t At an emergency United Nations
Security Council meeting on April 5, 2017, the Syrian representative to
the United Nations asserted that the Syrian government was not responsible and had complied with all of its obligations under the Chemical
Sarin is a nerve agent that blocks the "proper operation of an enzyme that acts as the
9.
body's 'off switch' for glands and muscles. Without an 'off switch,' the glands and muscles are
constantly being stimulated. Exposed people may become tired and no longer be able to keep breathPREVENTION,
CONTROL
&
DISEASE
CTRS.
FOR
Sarin
(GB),
ing."
https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp (last updated Nov. 18, 2015). It is the "most
volatile" of all nerve agents because it is colorless, odorless, and "can easily and quickly evaporate
from a liquid into a vapor and spread into the environment." Id.
Louisa Loveluck & Zakaria Zakaria, World Health Organization:Syria ChemicalAttack
10.
2017),
5,
(Apr.
POST
WASH.
Agent,
Nerve
Involved
Likely
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-blames-syrian-rebels-for-devastating-chemical-

attack-in-northern-town/2017/04/05/bal73c76-196a-lle7-8598-9a99da559f9estory.html;

see also

Barnard & Gordon, supra note I (stating that doctors found victims with "pinpoint pupils" that
"characterize nerve agents and other banned poisons").
11.
OLE SOLVANG, DEATH BY CHEMICALS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 21 (May 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/01/death-chemicals/syrian-governments-widespread-andsystematic-use-chemical-weapons.
Down to Assad, supra note 6.
12.
Syria Chemical 'Attack': Russia Faces Fury at UN Security Council, BBC (Apr. 5, 2017),
13.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500319.
The Latest: Russian Says Rebel-Held Town in Syria Exposed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 5,
14.

2017), https://www.apnews.com/69edel 0b25e542268ebd5fbflfe0fa42.
15. Id.
16.
17.

Syrian

Down to Assad, supra note 6.
Abigail Williams, Secretary Tillerson on Russia: 'Complicit or Simply Incompetent' on

Chemical

Weapons,

NBC

NEWS

(Apr.

7,

2017,

2:15

AM),

https://www.nbenews.com/news/world/secretary-tillerson-russia-complicit-or-simply-incompetentsyrian-chemical-weapons-n743686.
Loveluck & Zakaria, supra note 10.
18.

24
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Weapons Convention (CWC).1 9 Britain, France, and the United States
put forward a resolution condemning the attack and calling for an investigation, but Russia vetoed the resolution as "unacceptable." 20 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley took a firm stance against
Russia's repeated protection of Syria and issued the following warning:
"When the United Nations consistently fails in its duty to act collectively, there are times in the life of states that we are compelled to take our
own action. For the sake of the victims, I hope that the rest of the Council is finally willing to do the same." 2 1
Two days after the attack, the United States launched a missile attack that sent fifty-nine rockets to the air base in Syria from which the
United States claimed the chemical weapons were fired.22 Ambassador
Haley justified the strike at the U.N., stating: "The moral stain of the
Assad regime could no longer go unanswered. His crimes against humanity could no longer be met with empty words. It was time to say
'enough'-but not only say it. It was time to act." 23 The United States
was praised by its allies, including Germany, Britain, and France,24 but
the Syrian government decried the attack as "reckless, irresponsible behavior" and stated that the United States was "naively dragged in by a
false propaganda campaign." 2 5 Russia, as well as other non-permanent
members of the Security Council such as Bolivia, sharply criticized the
attack, calling it a violation of Syria's sovereignty, "an act of aggression
against a sovereign state delivered in violation of international law under
a far-fetched pretext" and suspending the "deconfliction channel" that
was created to prevent unintentional encounters between U.S. and Russian forces operating within Syria.26 Russian and Syrian officials alleged
that nine civilians, including four children, as well as six servicemen
were killed in the U.S. missile strike and that only twenty-three of the
fifty-nine rockets hit their targets and destroyed six planes.27

19.

U.N. SCOR, 72nd Sess., 7915th rntg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7915 (Apr. 5, 2017).

20.

Russia: Proposed U.N. Syria Resolution Based on "FakeInformation," REUTERS (Apr. 5,

2017, 7:18 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-zakharova-idlNKBN1771 OP.
21.
U.N. Doc. S/PV.7915, supranote 19.

22.
Syria War: US Launches Missile Strikes in Response to 'Chemical Attack,' BBC (Apr. 7,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39523654.

23.

Bill Chappell, Russia Says U.S. Broke InternationalLaw in Striking Syria, Citing 'Pre-

-

text,' NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Apr. 7, 2017, 8:27 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo7 4 07 522982477
way/201 /0 / /
/russia-says-u-s-broke-international-law-in-striking-syria-citing-pretext.
24.
Chiara Palazzo & Peter Foster, 'Assad Bears Full Responsibility': How the World Reacted
to Donald Trump's Missile Strike on Syria, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2017, 6:37 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/us-air-strike-syria-world-reacted-donald-trumpsdecision-intervene.
25.
Harriet Alexander, Danny Boyle & Barney Henderson, US Launches Strike on Syria

How

It

Unfolded,

TELEGRAPH

(Apr.

7,

2017,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/us-launches-strike-syria-unfolded.

26.

Chappell, supra note 23.

27.

Alexander, Boyle & Henderson, supra note 25.

5:44

PM),
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To what extent was this use of force permitted under international
law? When the world fails to act collectively, how far can an individual
state go to fight against such brutality? These same questions were
posed in August 2013, when the Syrian government under President Assad released rounds of the chemical agent sarin on its people.28 Hundreds
29
of civilians, including children, died and thousands were injured. The
30
Syrian government denied responsibility, and the U.N. Security Council was incapable of acting because China and Russia vetoed every resolution. 1 The United States then threatened to act on its own and conduct
a targeted military strike to render Syria incapable of using chemical
weapons, but when Syria agreed to sign the CWC and rid the country of
its chemical stockpiles, it appeared that such a military strike was unnec32
essary.
In 2013, if Syria had not acceded to the CWC, would the United
States have been able to conduct its military strike legally under international law? Four years later, because Syria ostensibly violated multiple
provisions of the CWC, particularly Article I (prohibiting the development, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and requiring their destruction) and Articles IV and V, and committed a crime against humanity, did the United States act legally when it took military action against
Syria without the approval of the United Nations? The U.N. Charter,
developed in response to the horrors of World War II, enables a state to
use force against another only with the Security Council's approval or if
the attacking nation is acting in self-defense. These requirements uphold the ideals of a country's sovereignty. But in the face of gross humanitarian violations, what happens when the Security Council is deadlocked and fails to act? The U.N. Charter does not provide any other
means by which a country, whether alone or in a group,34 can take mili-

28.

Rep. of UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the

Syrian Arab Republic, In 27-29, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553 (Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter U.N.
Mission Report].

29.

Syria

Chemical

Attack:

What

We

Know,

BBC

(Sept.

24,

2013),

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399.

30.

Id.

See Syria Resolution Authorizing Military Force Fails in U.N. Security Council, CBS
31.
NEWS, (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-resolution-authorizingmilitary-force-fails-in-un-security-council [hereinafter CBS NEWS].
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Statement by the President on Syria (Aug. 31, 2013)
32.
at
available
(transcript
Syria]
on
President
the
by
Statement
[hereinafter
Barack Obama,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria);
President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria (Sept. 10, 2013)
[hereinafter Remarks by the President] (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria).

33.

U.N. Charter art. 42, 51.

Article 53 allows regional organizations to take military action, but this still
34.
Security Council approval. U.N. Charter art. 53, T 1. There have been instances, however,
post facto authorization has occurred. Inger Osterdahl, Preach What You Practice. The
Council and the Legalisation Ex Post Facto of the UnilateralUse of Force, 74 NORDIC J.

231, 239 (2005).

requires
when ex
Security
INT'L L.
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tary action without Security Council approval, and no Article in the
Charter specifically mentions humanitarian intervention.35
In the U.N. report on the investigation of the 2013 alleged chemical
weapons use in Syria, former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated:
"The international community has a moral responsibility to hold accountable those responsible and for ensuring that chemical weapons can
never re-emerge as an instrument of warfare." 36 From the lessons learned
through Kosovo, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, is there a "responsibility
to protect" norm that now permits a country or the international community, to act unilaterally-without U.N. authorization-to halt human
rights violations? This Article utilizes the United States' attempt to intervene in Syria as an example to demonstrate how, under the emerging
'responsibility to protect" doctrine, the United States, or any individual
state, may be permitted to use military force against Syria in response to
its use of chemical weapons.
Humanitarian intervention is defined simply as the threat or use of
coercive action for the purpose of protecting or assisting people at risk.37
Another classic definition is the "threat or use of armed force by a state,
a belligerent community, or an international organization, with the object
of protecting human rights."3 8
This Article will analyze humanitarian intervention through the
framework developed by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was created in 2000 in response to

35.
T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). The General Assembly, however, passed the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution, stating that when the Security Council fails to fulfill its primary
responsibility of maintaining peace, the General Assembly will take on such a responsibility. See
Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 3

(2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufpe.pdf.
36.
Note by the Secretary-General, Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in
the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the

Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,

¶

1, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553 (Sept.

16, 2013) [hereinafter Note by the Secretary-General] (emphasis added).
37.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT, at VII (2001) [hereinafter ICISS].
38.
Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 217, 217 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974). "Humanitarian Intervention" has been defined in
similar ways. For example, one definition is "the justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting
the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the
limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice." Ocran, supra note 35,
at 8 (quoting E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (1931)); Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Customary
International Law Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N.

Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 204 (1974). Although this type of intervention is thought of
primarily as military, it may also include material assistance (providing food, medical supplies, etc.)
and economic sanctions. Ocran, supra note 35, at 8. Another, broader definition is limited to the
instances when a state "unilaterally uses military force to intervene in the territory of another state
for the purpose of protecting a sizable group of indigenous people from life-threatening or otherwise
unconscionable infractions of their human rights that the national government inflicts or in which it
acquiesces." David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U.

TOL. L. REV. 253, 264 (1992).
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former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plea to the international
39
community to develop responses to grave human rights violations. The
Canadian government initiated the Commission, comprised of representatives from Australia, Algeria, Russia, South Africa, Germany, Philip40
pines, Switzerland, Guatemala, India, and the United States.
Part I of this paper will provide a brief history of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Part H will examine the details of the broader Syrian conflict and the state's human rights responsibilities under international law. Part III will then discuss the United States' inability to act
through collective action under the U.N. Charter. Part IV will analyze the
self-defense claim as another mechanism for attack. Finally, Part V will
explore the United States' responsibility to protect through the threeprong doctrine laid out by ICISS: responsibility to prevent, responsibility
to react, and responsibility to rebuild. Under this doctrine, the United
States was permitted to launch a limited military strike in Syria without
Security Council approval to halt the gross violations of human rights.
Hindsight is twenty-twenty, but the world can learn from the past to prevent tragedy in the future. When the world has witnessed a blatant recurrence of human rights violations, it must act to prevent history from repeating itself.
I. HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SYRIA

On August 21, 2013, at least fifteen rockets exploded on the streets
of Syria.4 1 Videos showed dozens of bodies with no external injuries
42
lying lifeless in the streets, in clinics, and in mosques. Adults and children convulsed and gasped for air, choking on their own saliva as their
43
mouths foamed and fluids ran from their eyes and noses. Based on the
size and trajectory of the rockets' remnants, the United States and Human Rights Watch" accused the Syrian government of launching the
*45
attack and using the chemical agent sarin on innocent civilians.
Syrian President Assad denied responsibility: "How is it possible
that any country would use chemical weapons, or any weapons of mass

39.
40.

ICISS, supra note 37, app. b at 81.
Id. app. a at 77-79.

41.

Syria ChemicalAttack: What We Know, supra note 29.

42.

Id.

Id.; Barnard & Gordon, supra, note 1.
43.
Human Rights Watch is an independent organization that focuses on researching and
44.
advocating against various human rights violations. It monitors conditions in eighty countries and
publishes its findings in numerous reports and news releases. See FrequentlyAsked Questions, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/node/75138#3 (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Gov't Assessment of the
45.

Syrian Government's Use of Chem. Weapons on August 21, 2013 (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian2
government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august- 1; Syria: Government Likely Culprit in Chemical
Attack, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/10/syriagovernment-likely-culprit-chemical-attack.
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destruction, in an area where its own forces are located? . . . This is preposterous! These accusations are completely politicized .... 46 Tnstead,
the Syrian government, along with its Russian ally, blamed rebel forces
for the attack and for attempting to spur a U.S.-led invasion.4 7 The United Nations led an independent investigation48 on site,49 conducting numerous interviews with survivors 5 0 and medical personnel," obtaining
medical 52 and environmental 3 samples, and documenting ammunitions. 54
It then released a report confirming that, chemical weapons, including
sarin, had been used between the parties in Syria.
Britain introduced a draft proposal to the U.N. Security Council
seeking authorization for military action against Syria 56 under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes collective action measures that
could include military intervention under the Security Council's guidance." The five permanent members held an informal, closed-door meeting, but the parties could not come to an agreement. Russia and China
left the meeting after one hour; France, the United States, and the United
Kingdom remained for another hour. 9 The draft resolution went back to
each local government for consultation but never resurfaced, presumably

46.
These remarks were translated by Syria's official news agency from an interview President Assad conducted with the Russian newspaper Izvestia. Patrick J. McDonnell, Syria's Assad

Denies

Use

of

Chemical

Weapons,

L.A.

TIMES

(Aug.

26,

2013),

http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/26/world/la-fg-wn-syria-assad-denies-use-of-chemical-

weapons-20130826.
47.
Id.; see also Vladimir V. Putin, Opinion, A Pleafor Cautionfrom Russia, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russiaon-syria.html.

48.

U.N. Mission Report, supra note 28,

¶

1.

49.
The investigation was focused in Moadamiyah in West Ghouta and Ein Tarma and Zamalka in East Ghouta. Id. ¶ 15.
50.
The Mission interviewed thirty-six survivors who displayed severe symptoms. They
underwent a clinical assessment, including a brief health history and a physical examination. The
main symptoms consisted of "loss of consciousness (78%), shortness of breath (61%), blurred vision
(42%), eye irritation/inflammation (22%), excessive salivation (22%), vomiting (22%), and convul-

sions/seizures (19%)." Id. T 25, app. 4.
51.
Clinicians who treated people in the field or at the hospital were asked questions regarding
the symptoms they observed, treatments provided, and whether there was secondary contamination.

Id. app. 4.
52.
Sarin was present in 91% of 34 blood samples drawn. Out of 15 urine samples taken, 93%
tested positive for sarin. Id.
53.
Environmental samples included soil samples acquired near rocket warheads, clothing,
pieces of fabric from beds and carpets, rubble, and rocket fragments. Id app. 6.
54.
The munitions research included collecting rocket heads, examining craters and other
damage, obtaining rocket motors, and measuring all warheads. The Mission determined the trajectories and types of rockets used, some as variants of M14 artillery rockets that launched from a single,
multi-barrel launcher and others as 330 mm caliber artillery rockets. See id. app. 5.
55.
Id. at 8. President Assad told the Russian newspaper Izvestia that he feared the U.N.
investigation results would be interpreted unfairly: "We are all aware that instead of being interpreted in an objective manner, these results could easily be interpreted according to the requirements and
agendas of certain major countries." McDonnell, supra note 46.
56.
CBS NEWS, supra note 31.

57.

U.N. Charter ch. 7.

58.

CBS NEWS, supra note 31.

59.

Id.
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because China and Russia would block the resolution if it were up for
voting.60 Russia, one of Syria's closest allies, 6 1 and China have previous62
ly vetoed other proposals regarding action against Syria.
After failed peace talks with Russia and Syria, former President
Barack Obama decided that, if Congress approved, a targeted military
strike aimed at Syria's chemical weapons units, artillery, and aircraft,
would send a message to President Assad and to other dictators that the
international community would not tolerate the use of chemical weapons. 63 But the threat of military intervention seemed to be enough, for
Russia agreed to help the United States forge an agreement with President Assad to give up the chemical weapons. 64 The plan entailed destroying all of Syria's stockpiles and chemical weapons facilities by June 30,
65
2014, and Russia would oversee the removal. Syria acceded to the
66
CWC on September 14, 2013, entering into force on October 14, 2013.
The U.N. Security Council then adopted a resolution on September 27,
2013, condemning Syria's use of chemical weapons.67
Since Syria acceded to the CWC, progress had been made in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons production facilities, with twentyfour of twenty-seven destroyed as of November 2015.68 But the goal of
ridding the country of all of its stockpiles was grossly unmet, with only
eleven percent of the stockpiles removed by the deadline imposed by the
OPCW.69 However, the use of various chemical agents has consistently
Id; see also Farnaz Fassihi, Peter Nicholas & Nicholas Winning, U.S., U.K. Face Delays

60.

in

to

Push

Strike

Syria,

WALL

STREET

J.

(Aug.

28,

2013,

PM),

1:43

https://www.wsj.com/articles/uk-to-request-un-action-to-protect-syrians-from-chemical-weapons-

1377685475;

Syria Crisis: UK

Puts Forward UN Proposal, BBC

(Aug.

28,

2013),

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23864124.
With regards to the potential of a biased interpretation of the U.N. results, President Assad
61.
stated, "Certainly, we expect Russia to block any interpretation that aims to serve American and
western polices." McDonnell, supra note 46.

62.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 77, (Feb. 4, 2012); S.C. Res. 612, (Oct. 4, 2011).

Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32. Former Legal Adviser to President
63.
Obama and Yale Law Professor Harold H. Koh argued that Congressional approval was not required
to take limited military action because it did not rise to the level of "war" such that it would trigger
the Declaration of War clause of the U.S. Constitution. Rather, he argued that President Obama's
appeal to Congress was "politically prudent." See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law ofHumanitarian Intervention (PartI PoliticalMiscues and U.S. Law), JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013, 4:30
AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/l l58/koh-syria.
Address to the Nation on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOc. 615, at 3
64.

(Sept. 10, 2013).
Org. for Prohibition Chemical Weapons [OPCW], OPCW Adopts Plan for Destruction of
65.
Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme in the First Half of 2014 (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-adopts-plan-for-destruction-of-syrias-chemical-weapons-

programme-in-the-first-half-of-2014.
66.

Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], Rep. of the Seventy-Fourth Session

of the Executive Council, EC-74/5 (Oct. 2013).
S.C. Res. 2118, (Sept. 27, 2013).
67.
Org. for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], Report of the OPCW on the
68.
Implementation of the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling

and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2015, ¶¶ 1-2, C21/4 (Nov. 30, 2016).

Salma Abdelaziz & Jim Sciutto, OPCW: Only 11% of Chemical Weapons Removed from
69.
Syria, CNN (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/12/world/meast/syria-civil-war.
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been documented since Syria signed the CWC. 70 The United Nations
concluded from results of an independent investigation that the Syrian
government had dropped chlorine gas bombs on its people on at least
three separate occasions in 2014 and 2015.
In response, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2235 to identify those responsible for the use of these weapons,
also stating that it would impose certain measures if violations of the use
of chemical weapons occurred.7 2 The OPCW reported that blood samples
taken from victims of an attack in January 2016 indicated the presence of
the agent sarin or a sarin-like substance.73 Human Rights Watch reported
at, least eight instances of chlorine gas bombs being dropped between
November and December 2016.74 Then, on April 4, 2017, the Syrian
government launched its biggest chemical weapons attack since 2013.75
II.

SYRIA'S CRISIS AND ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW

The overarching conflict in Syria began in 2011 when groups opposing President Assad's rule began protesting and demanding his resignation.76 Rallies spread across the country as the people demanded a
functioning democracy, and violence erupted as the government began
using tanks, rockets, and bombs to try quell the opposition. 7 7 Since the
uprisings, roughly 400,000 people have been killed,
thousands of
whom are children. 79 The conflict has led to one of the greatest refugee
crises in modern history, with over five million registered refugees having fled the country seeking shelter in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt,

70.

See id.

71.

Press Release, Security Council Considers Fourth Report by Joint Investigative Mecha-

nism, U.N. Press Release DC/3668 (Oct. 27, 2016).
72.
S.C. Res. 2235, TT 1-3, 15 (Aug. 7, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2235 (2015), Establishing Mechanism to Identify Perpetrators Using Chemical Weapons in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/12001 (Aug. 7, 2015).
73.
Down to Assad, supra note 6. For a full timeline and history of the civil war in Syria, see
Syrian Civil War Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-

fast-facts (last updated July 8, 2017, 10:12 AM).
74.
Syria: Coordinated Chemical Attacks on Aleppo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 13, 2017,
10:57 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/13/syria-coordinated-chemical-attacks-aleppo.

75.

See 'Chemical Attack' in Idlib Kills 58, supra note 5.

76.

Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-

middle-east-19331551 (follow "Protests" tab).
77.
Id. (follow "Bombardment" tab).
78.
Syria Envoy Claims 400,000 Have Died in Syria Conflict, UNITED NATIONS RADIO (Apr.
22, 2016), http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2016/04/syria-envoy-claims-400000-havedied-in-syria-conflict/#.WOU4svnyuO2.

79.

Syria War: 2016 Deadliest Year Yet for Children, Says Unicef BBC (Mar. 23, 2017),

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39252307.
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and Iraq.80 As of March 2017, another 6.3 million were internally dis82
placed,81 and over 13.5 million were in need of humanitarian aid.
The U.N. confirmed that chemical weapons were used in Syria on
August 21, 2013, and the Secretary-General called the act a "war crime"
and "grave violation" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other customary
international law.8 Syria has been a member of the U.N. since 1945.84
As such, it is obligated to uphold the human rights values set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations and in the subsequent Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is now largely considered to be
binding under customary international law.85 For example, Article 3 of
6
the UDHR states that everyone has the right to life. 8 Article 28 elaborates that people have the right to a social and international order in
which that right to life can be realized. 87 Article 30 further prohibits all
88
states from engaging in any act that would destroy this right.
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), an optional U.N. treaty to which Syria became a party in 1969,
protects parallel rights.89 Article 6 states that "Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily 90 deprived of his life." 91 This right to life has been considered
the "supreme human right" because without guarantees to it, all other
rights would lack any real meaning.92 This right has also been considered
jus cogens under international law,93 meaning that it is an overriding,
fundamental principle of international law from which no state may de95
viate. 94 In fact, states must take active measures to uphold this right.
States have a supreme duty to prevent acts of mass violence that cause
80.

Syria Regional Refugee

Response,

UNHCR

see also
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php;
http://www.unocha.org/Syria (last visited Sept 21, 2017).
Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 80.
81.

82.
83.
84.

(last

updated

Syrian

Arab

Sept.

18,

Republic,

2017),
OCHA,

Id.

Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 36, ¶ 1.
Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml

(last

visited Sept. 21, 2017).
See ICISS, supranote 37, at 6, 14.
85.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948).
86.
87. Id. art. 28.
Id. art. 30.
88.
See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. I
89.
1, art. 5 ¶ 2, art. 6 11 (Dec. 16, 1966).

¶

The use of the term "arbitrarily" was criticized as being too vague. But the Human Rights
90.
Committee justified its use because the word encompasses both intentional and unintentional killings. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR

COMMENTARY 127-28 (2d rev. ed. 2005).
91. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 89, at art. 6
92.

NOWAK, supranote 90, at 121.

93.

Id. at 122.

¶ 1.

Jus cogens "is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
94.
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
95.

NOWAK, supra note 90, at 122.
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arbitrary loss of life.96 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that
this inherent right 'exists in times of both war and peace and explained
that whether loss of life from specific weaponry violates Article 6 is determined by examining the laws governing the use of that weapon.
The use of chemical weapons violates the right to life as set forth in
the UDHR and ICCPR. 9 8 In its General Comment to Article 6 of the
ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee expressed its growing concern
regarding the development and proliferation of "awesome weapons of
mass destruction," citing nuclear weapons as among the greatest threats
to the right to life. 99 Chemical weapons, though not specifically mentioned in the comment, create this same threat of mass annihilation. The
U.N. recognized the extreme danger they pose because a single attack
can inflict mass casualties. 00 Though the death toll from the chemical
weapons attack was difficult to establish, Doctors Without Borders estimated that 3,600 people had been injured, of which 355 died.' 1 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights confirmed at least 502 deaths.' 02 The
United States government initially reported that 1,429 people had been
killed but could not elaborate on the methods for determining that figure
and why that number was so much higher than other reported estimates.1 0 3 By killing indiscriminately and in mass, the weapons "arbitrarily deprive" human beings of their inherent right to life and human dignity, as explained by the laws prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and
U.N. resolutions ascribing the importance of the prohibition.
Syria is a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.' 04 The Protocol
prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war but does not
restrict a country from producing or possessing them. 0 5 It states that the
96.
Id. at 125.
97.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
240 (July 8).
98.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 14, ¶ 1, HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol. 1)
(Nov. 9, 1984).
99.
100.

Id. ¶ 3; see also NOWAK, supra note 90, at 126.
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared

Responsibility, ¶ 114, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter High Level Panel].

&

101.
Syria: Thousands Suffering Neurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by
MSF, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.msf.org/article/syria-thousandssuffering-neurotoxic-symptoms-treated-hospitals-supported-msf
102.
Syria ChemicalAttack: What We Know, supra note 29.
103.
The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 45; see also Ken Dilanian

Shashank Bengali, U.S. Toll for Syria Higher than Others', L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/04/world/la-fg-syria-casualties-20130904.
104.
Protocolfor the Prohibitionof the Use ofAsphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsflStates.xsp?xpviewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xp
tr

eatySelected=280 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
105.
See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 [hereinafter Gene-
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use of these weapons in war has been condemned by the civilized world
and that the prohibition shall be universally binding as international
law. 06
In 1993, the OPCW developed the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weap07
ons and on their Destruction, commonly called the CWC.1 Article 1
prohibits each state party from developing, producing, acquiring, stockweapons.i 0
piling, retaining, transferring, and using chemical
Syria was not a party to the CWC at the time of its chemical weapons use,1 09 so it was not technically beholden to the Convention's provisions. However, Syria still had an obligation not to use chemical weapons because the nonuse of chemical weapons is almost universally accepted and is becoming an international norm.' 10 As of November 2013,
190 countries were parties to the Convention,"' representing about ninety-eight percent of the global population and landmass.112 As depositary
of the Convention, the Secretary-General has long called for its universality and stated that "any use of chemical weapons by anyone under any
circumstances is a grave violation of international law," referring to the
Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and customary international
law.1 13
Additionally, both the U.N. General Assembly and the Security
Council have adopted a number of resolutions affirming the importance
of the CWC.11 4 One General Assembly resolution from 2001, adopted
without a vote, 15 emphasized the necessity of universal adherence to the
Convention and called upon states not party to the Convention to become
parties immediately.1 6 In a separate section of that same resolution, the
va Protocol]; Marian Nash (Leich), Arms Control and Disarmament, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 324

(1994).
Geneva Protocol, supranote 105.
106.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
107.
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, openedfor signatureJan. 13, 1993, S Treaty Doc. No.

103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
108. Id. art. 1.
109.
See Member State - Syria, ORG. FOR PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/member-states-by-region/asia/member-state-syria

(last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
110.

See Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 36, TT 1, 4.

111.

Org. for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], Note by the Technical Secretari-

at, Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 14 October 2013, S/1131/2013

(Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S-series/2013/en/s-l 131-2013_e_.pdf.
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FOR
of Participation, ORG.
112.
Status
https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/status-of-participation/

2017).
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(last visited Sept. 22,

1, 3-4.

113.

Note by the Secretary General, supra note 36,

114.

See, e.g., G.A. Res. 55/33, at 13 (Jan. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 2118, at I (Sept. 27, 2013).

This resolution has multiple sections, and the General Assembly voted for each section
115.
separately. The section referred to in this Note is Section H, which the First Committee adopted
without a vote and the General Assembly followed suit.

116.

G.A. Res. 55/33, at 13 (Jan. 12, 2001).
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Assembly renewed its call to all states to "observe strictly" the principles
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.' 17 This section was adopted by 163 votes
and five abstentions, including the United States." 8 Another resolution
signed in December 2012 expressed the same message of the "longstanding determination of the international community to achieve the
effective prohibition" of the stockpiling and use of chemical weapons
and to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol.1 9 This resolution was adopted
by 181 votes with four abstentions, including the United States.120 These
aforementioned statements suggest that the non-use of chemical weapons
is considered binding universal law, or if not, increasingly moving towards that direction.
Three months before the 2013 chemical weapons attack, the General Assembly adopted a resolution specific to the ongoing violence in
Syria. 121 The resolution demanded that the Syrian government "strictly
observe their obligations under international law with respect to chemical
and biological weapons," including the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Security Council resolution 1540 adopted in 2004.122 This Security Council
resolution affirmed that the proliferation of chemical weapons is a threat
to international peace and security and required that all states "take and
enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means
of delivery." 23 It also expressed concern about the trafficking of these
weapons and the risk that non-state actorsl24 will acquire them.1 25 Acting
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council decided that
all states must make and enforce domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and must promote the universal adoption and
fulfillment of all treaties related to chemical weapons.126
These resolutions demonstrate that the U.N. expected Syria to follow the international norms created by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the
Convention, even though it was not a party to the latter.127 Article 25 of
the Charter binds all states, by their membership in the United Nations,
to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions, regardless of

117.
118.
2000).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 16.
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 69th plen. mtg. at 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.69 (Nov. 20,
G.A. Res. 67/35, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2013).
U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 48th plen. mtg. at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/67/PV.48 (Dec. 3, 2012).
G.A. Res. 67/262 (June 4, 2013).
Id. ¶ 11.
S.C. Res. 1540, at 1 (Apr. 28, 2004).

124.
The resolution defines a "Non-State actor" as an "individual or entity, not acting under the
lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution." Id. at 1.
125.
Id. at 2.

126.

Id. at 2-3.

127.

See Member State - Syria, supranote 109.
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whether they agree. 12 Syria thus had an obligation under international
law not to make and use chemical weapons in both wartime and in
peacetime. Consequently, it can be argued that Syria violated international law and could be held accountable for its actions.
III. COLLECTIVE ACTION
The primary way for a country to attack another is through collec29
tive action and authorization by the U.N. Security Council.1 If that does
not work, a country can ask the General Assembly, which has the secondary responsibility to maintain international peace after the Security
130
Council, to vote to put pressure on the Security Council, or it can seek
3
assistance from a regional international organization.' ' The responsibility to protect doctrine arises when these options have failed and a state
wants to act unilaterally.
The U.N. Charter expressly states that the United Nations is built
32
upon the idea of sovereignty for all its members.' Two Articles specifically illustrate the foundational principle of nonintervention: Articles
2(4) and 2(7). First, Article 2(4) prohibits U.N. members from threatening or using force against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations." 3 3 This prohibition is a cornerstone of the Charter. 134 Article 2(4) does not define "use of force." But the word "force" is
used to mean "armed force," as evidenced by Paragraph 7 of the Preamble to the Charter, which states that a goal of the United Nations is to
prevent armed force; Article 44 of the Charter, which explains how the
Security Council can use armed forces; and the travaux pr6paratoiesof
the Charter, which illustrate that military force is the primary concern of
the prohibition against the use of force.' 35 Moreover, if "force" could
include political and economic force, countries would be left with no
36
other means to pressure states .that violate international law.1 Article
2(4) also applies to the "threat" of force. But threats are often tolerated
and not violative of the Article unless they directly threaten force to

U.N. Charter art. 25 ("The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
128.
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.").

129.
130.

See id art. 1, ¶ 1, art. 39.
ICISS, supra note 37, 16.29.

131.

Ocran, supra note 35, at 48.

132.

U.N. Charter art. 2, 11.

U.N. Charter art. 2, 14; see Ocran, supranote 35 at 16.
133.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
134.
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19). The ICJ also reinforced the idea that a state cannot intervene in a
country in order to support an internal opposition within the state. It held that Uganda's interference
was of such great magnitude and duration to gravely violate Article 2(4)'s prohibition against the use

of force. Id.
135.

¶

165.

1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 208-09 (Bruno Simma et al.

eds., 3d ed. 2012).
Id. at 209.
136.
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compel a state to give up territory or remove political leadership.1 37 In
the instant situation, the United States threatened force for neither of
those reasons.
This prohibition on the use of force is considered customary lawl 38
andjus cogens and is a core value accepted by the international community.' 39 Thus, to use unilateral force against a sovereign state, the intervening country must justify its use on an exception to the general rule.
Two such exceptions are self-defense, discussed below in Part V, and
humanitarian intervention, discussed below in Part VI.
Additionally, Article 2(7) prohibits the United Nations as an organization from interfering in those matters of a sovereign state that fall within its "domestic jurisdiction," 40 with exceptions for threats and breaches
of peace and acts of aggression.141 Sovereign states have exclusive jurisdiction over their territory, and other states have a duty not to intervene
in another country's internal affairs, or its "domestic jurisdiction." 42 If
that duty is violated, the victim state can retaliate in self-defense.1 43 But
ideas of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are evolving as new international actors and issues emerge, including human rights violations.1 44
As stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice, "The question
whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a
State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of
international relations." 4 5 More specifically, it depends on whether the
matter is governed by international law in certain respects.146 Furthermore, as international treaties and organizations become more numerous,
a state's international obligations penetrate into its domestic law all while
affecting other states as well.1 47 For example, ethnic groups striving for
self-determination, displacement of refugees fleeing from war and other
natural and manmade disasters, and multinational organizations working
in and among a host of countries all underscore the idea that certain domestic issues have an international impact.148

137.

Id. at 218.

138.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 188 (June 27). Its place in customary international law is further evidenced by
reports of the International Law Commission as well as statements of state representatives who refer

to Article 2(4) as a "cardinal principle" of law. Id.

¶

190.

139.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 135, at 203.

140.

U.N. Charter art. 2, 17.

141.

Ocran, supra note 35, at 16.

142.
143.
144.
145.
B) No. 4,

ICISS, supra note 37, 1 6.2.
Id. ¶ 6.4.
Thomas M. Franck, Lessons ofKosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 857-58 (1999).
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
at 24 (Feb. 7).

146.
147.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 135, at 292.
Bartram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.

1683, 1697 (2000).
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Scheffer, supranote 38, at 260.
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There is growing acceptance that matters of life and death are no
longer reserved for the country at issue but are of concern for the greater
international community. 149 The Charter itself recognizes respect for
human rights as one of the main purposes of the United Nations: "To
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouragingrespectfor human rights andfor fundamentalfreedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . ."1so

This language demonstrates that instances of human rights violations that
occur within a sovereign state are of international concern and not only
within the state's domestic jurisdiction.' 5 1 For instance, in the 1960s,
South Africa claimed that the U.N. General Assembly's statements
against the apartheid violated Article 2(7) because the apartheid was a
domestic

issue.152

But the

United

Nations

determined

that

anti-

apartheid actions were beyond the scope of domestic jurisdiction, even
though they involved domestic issues,15 3 and called upon all states to
154
Proconform their laws to the Charter's observance of human rights.
fessor Bruno Simma suggests that, although "domestic jurisdiction" is
not obsolete, systematic and widespread violations of human rights do
not need to be alleged to overcome Article 2(7).
Additionally, in response to the atrocities committed in Uganda by
dictator Idi Amin, Ugandan President Museveni attacked the specific
issue with the sovereignty argument:
Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandans perished at the hands of governments that should have protected their
lives . . . I must state that Ugandans . . . felt a deep sense of betrayal
that most of Africa kept silent . . . the reason for not condemning

such massive crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in
the internal affairs of a Member State, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations. We do not accept this reasoning because in the same organs there are explicit laws that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life.1 56

149.

Jeremy Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The

Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 340 (1998);
Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: PoliticalRhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J.

INT'L L. 99, 101 (2007).
U.N. Charter art. 1, 1 3 (emphasis added). The U.N. Charter Preamble reiterates this
150.
purpose: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small . . . ." U.N. Charter
pmbl.; see also id arts. 55-56.
Brown, supra note 147, at 1689; see also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
151.
COMMENTARY, supranote 135, at 297.
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 135, at 296.
152.
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Scheffer, supranote 38, at 261-62.

154.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 135, at 296.

155.

Id. at 297-98.

Yoweri Museveni, Uganda President, Org. of African Unity [OAU], Maiden Speech to the
156.
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Twenty-Second Ord. Session (July 1986).
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This statement demonstrates the inherent conflict with the U.N.
Charter in that it professes the fundamentality of human rights and yet
has no express provisions to uphold those human rights. The U.N. Charter still generally requires a country to secure authorization from the Security Council before taking action within another state."' Article 1(1) of
the Charter states that one purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace .
."158 This collective action refers to the joining of multiple states, including the use of regional organizations, to end acts of violence. 159
However, obtaining approval for collective action is difficult, if not impossible, in certain instances. Failure of the Security Council to authorize
such collective action under circumstances of gross human rights violations may enable a single state to act unilaterally, provided it has met the
other requirements of the ICISS framework, discussed in Part VI.
Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter confers on the Security Council
the "primary responsibility" for maintaining this international peace and
security. 160 The Security Council has the power to authorize collective
action when peaceful measures fail; "In other words, forceful action to
prevent mass atrocity crimes is reserved to the Security Council."1 6 1 Such
responsibility involves a political, moral, and legal requirement to act.162
It also includes the responsibility to protect its member states, 163 a residual responsibility that falls upon the international community when the
state at issue cannot meet its primary responsibility.1 64 But as SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon stated in 2009, "Within the Security Council, the
five permanent members bear particular responsibility because of the
privileges of tenure and the veto power . . ."165
The veto has become the primary obstacle that prevents the mitigation or termination of a grave humanitarian crisis.166 ICISS expressed
1

157.

U.N. Charter art. 1,

158.
159.
160.

Id. art. 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
ICISS, supra note 37, ¶¶ 6.5, 6.31.
U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.

1, art. 24.

161.
Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria: HumanitarianIntervention and
Responsibility to Protect, EJIL: TALK!, (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarianintervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-legality-of-military-action-in-syria.
162.
See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 766.
This legal responsibility, however, lacks a legal remedy if the Security Council fails to act. "It is
however, perfectly enviseagable that the Council's responsibility will harden into a legal obligation
of conduct which can be violated by the Council's complete passivity or its obviously inadequate
reaction in the face of massive atrocity." Id. at 775.
163.
See id at 775-76. Some commentators disagree that the Security Council's responsibility
is to the U.N. members but argue rather that it is to the organization itself. See id.
164.
Id. at 767; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,

¶

14, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (indicating that the sovereign state has the primary respon-

sibility to protect the human rights of its people).
165.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, ¶ 61.

166.

ICISS, supra note 37,

¶ 6.20.

U.S. INTER VENTION IN SYRIA

2017]

39

concern that, despite the need to intervene in such a situation, a permanent member would use the veto power to advance its own national in167
terests, not because of a genuine disagreement about the proposal.
ICISS offered a solution, a "code of conduct" whereby the permanent
members would agree not to use the veto to obstruct a majority resolu68
tion in matters in which their vital national interests were not involved.1
But this is unlikely to be successful because many issues can be tied to a
vital national interest.
The veto power often deadlocks the Security Council, and ultimately it renders no assistance.169 Countries that want to take action are then
faced with a dilemma: do nothing and watch the atrocities occur, or take
action without the Security Council's authorization and potentially face
reprimand later or seek ex post facto approval.1 70 For example, NATO
did not seek prior Security Council permission to enter Kosovo for fear
that Russia would veto the proposal; Russia later, in fact, proposed a
resolution to declare the act unlawful.1 7 ' But NATO faced the above dilemma. Then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, Harold H. Koh, stated that most, if not all, of the
NATO states relied on some form of humanitarian intervention as the
legal justification for action.1 72 The United States did not claim the
NATO action was legal but rather that it was "justified and necessary to
stop the violence and prevent an even greater humanitarian disaster."1 73 The UK claimed that "as an exceptional measure on grounds of
overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally
justifiable." 74 The Netherlands did not give a clear legal reason for its
75
opinion other than that NATO action was "more than adequate.",

167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.16.21.
Id. 6.20.

See id TT 6.35-.36; Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law ofHumanitarianIntervention
170.
(Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY, (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2 ("By treating the veto alone as dispositive, the per
se position denies any nation, no matter how well-meaning, any lawful way to use even limited and
multilateralforce to preventAssadfrom intentionally gassinga million Syrian children tomorrow. In
the name of fidelity to the U.N. and this rigid conception of international law, leaders would either
have to accept civilian slaughter or break the law, because international law offers no lawful altemative to prevent the slaughter.").
Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "HumanitarianIntervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
171.

824, 825 (1999).
See Koh, supra note 170; Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment - the Legal Basis
172.
12, 2013),
in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL (Sept.
http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-ofhumanitarian-intervention.
Matthew Waxman, Intervention to Stop Atrocities: Kosovo History as Predictive,
173.
LAWFARE (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/intervention-to-stopatrocities-kosovo-history-as-predictive.

174.
175.

Id.
Id.
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Those opposing NATO action relied on the ideas of sovereignty and the
nonuse of force in Article 2(4).176
Critics, like Professor Simma, maintain that without Security Council authorization, any unilateral military action violates the Charter:

.

[I]f the Security Council determines that massive violations of human
rights occurring within a country constitute a threat to the peace, and
then calls for or authorizes an enforcement action to put an end to
these violations, a "humanitarian intervention" by military means is
permissible. In the absence of such authorization, military coercion .
. constitutes a breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Further, as long
as humanitarian crises do not transcend borders . . . and lead to armed

attacks against other states, recourse to Article 51 [self-defense] is
not available.1 77

-

At least 133 countries agree and oppose alteration of the standard in
the Charter.' 7 8
NATO's actions in Kosovo perhaps were illegal, as Professor Simma suggests, but ultimately, its actions protected human rights and elevated humanitarian law.1 79 "Undoubtedly, the UN Charter has taken a hit,
but perhaps not a very major one. Even an illegal action, if instrumental
in bringing about results widely desired by a community, will not seriously undermine a resilient legal system, one with the elasticity to make
allowances for mitigating circumstances."' 80 Interestingly, NATO did not
use humanitarian intervention as the legal justification for bombing Yugoslavia.' 8 ' Rather, it provided no legal reasoning at all and instead used
humanitarian intervention as the moral and political justification for entering the state.182 This humanitarian intervention is certainly an exception to the rule, not an attempt to reconfigure or upend the rules.' 83
Many small, militarily weak states oppose the idea of humanitarian
intervention because they believe their sovereignty depends on the strict
interpretation of Article 2(4).184 For example, Yugoslavia sued the United States for illegal use of force and violating the state's sovereignty in
Kosovo, but the ICJ never ruled on the issue because it said it lacked
176.

Id.

177.

See Franck, supra note 144, at 858 (alterations in original) (quoting Bruno Simma, NATO,

the UN and the Use ofForce: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1999)).
178.
Ryan Goodman, HumanitarianIntervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
107, 112 (2006) (citing Movement of the Non-aligned Countries, XIII Ministerial Conference, Final
Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,
¶263, U.N. Doc. A/54/917 (June 6, 2000) ("We reject the so-called 'right' of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of international law.")).
179.
Franck, supra note 144, at 859.

180.

Id.

181.

Brown, supranote 147, at 1685.

182.

Id.

183.
184.

Franck, supra note 144, at 859.
See Brown, supra note 147, at 1702.
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jurisdiction.'8 5 The situation is even trickier when the country desiring to
act is a powerful, permanent member of the Security Council claiming to
86
be entitled to act outside the Charter's framework.1
Such is the case here. In 2013, the United States determined that a
targeted military strike would be the best method to ensure that Syria
could not use chemical weapons again.' 87 But despite its attempts to
comply with the U.N. Charter, it could not get authorization from the
Security Council.' 88 The United Kingdom introduced a draft proposal to
the Security Council seeking authorization for military action, but Russia
and China blocked it.' 89 Russia in the past has vetoed seven Security
Council resolutions condemning President Assad's government, requir90
ing a cessation of violence, and threatening it with sanctions.' Thus, the
United States was faced with the aforementioned dilemma: be a bystander to a human atrocity, or take action without U.N. support.191 In a statement to the American people, President Obama decided: "I'm comfortable going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold
92
[President] A[s]sad accountable."1
Fast forward to 2017, and the United States under the Trump Administration chose the latter.'9 3 President Trump remarked: "There can be
no dispute that Syria used banned chemical weapons, violated its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and ignored the urging of
the UN Security Council. Years of previous attempts at changing As94
sad's behavior have all failed and failed very dramatically."' Russia yet
again vetoed a Security Council Resolution condemning the chemical
attack, bringing Russia's total vetoes of Syria-related Resolutions to
eight.1 95 U.S. Ambassador Haley remarked that with its veto,
Russia said no to accountability, Russia said no to cooperating with
the UN investigation, Russia said no to helping keep peace in Syria,
Russia chose to side with (Syrian President Bashar al-) Assad, even

Yugoslavia found jurisdiction under Article IX of the Convention for the Prevention and
185.
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. But the Court stated it has jurisdiction only over consenting
parties, and the United States had a reservation on the Convention that required its consent for juris-

diction. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 916, ¶ 29 (June 2).
ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 6.20.
186.
187.
See Remarks on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 596, at 1 (Aug. 31,
2013); Koh, supra note 63.
188.

See CBS NEWS, supra note 31.

189.

Fassihi, Nicholas & Winning, supra note 60.

190.
See
Security
Council
Veto
List,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
The United States' motives for taking action are discussed in further depth supra Part VI.
191.
192.
Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 187, at 2.
Barbara Starr & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Launches Military Strike Against Syria, CNN
193.

(Apr. 7, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://cnn.it/2oGmkDQ.
194.
Id.
See S.C. Res. 315, 11 (Apr. 12, 2017); Security Council - Veto List, supranote 190.
195.
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as rest of the world, even the Arab world, comes together to condemn
the murderous regime. 196
Once again, the veto has been used to deadlock the Security Council. History serves as a keen indicator that no action will come from the

U.N. Security Council; accordingly, collective action will fail.
IV.

SELF-DEFENSE

The second main way a country can justify an armed attack another

is through the self-defense doctrine. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
acknowledges "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,"
though requiring that the measures taken be reported immediately to the
Security Council.1 9 7 This self-defense can be undertaken only in response
to an armed attack.' 9 8 Such attacks include invasions by armed forces,
the sending of armed groups on behalf of the intervening state,1 99 bom-

bardment, blockades, attacks on military warships and aircraft, and largescale, cross-border use of weapons. 200 Occupation and annexation typi-

cally are not considered armed attacks, even though they generally include the use of military force. 20 1 Article 51 also allows for collective
self-defense, where the attacked state can request the help of other countries in its retaliation.20 2
A more contentious justification is that of preemptory self-defense.
No international consensus exists as to when in time a country can

launch a retaliatory attack.20 3 The debate reemerged in 2002 when the
United States proclaimed the "Bush Doctrine" 204 and invaded Iraq as a
preemptive attack on terrorists.

205

The government argued the United

States was "defending the United States, the American people, and our
interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat
before it reaches our borders."

196.

206

As explained by the Secretary-General,

Richard Roth, Russia Vetoes UN Resolution on Syria, CNN (Apr. 13, 2017, 12:20 AM),

http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/assad-syria-sarin-gas.
197.
U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-

gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14,

T 200 (June

27).

198.
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 195; see also 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 1403.

¶ 195.

199.

Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J.

200.
201.

2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 1410-11.
Id. at 1410.
Id. at 1420-21.
Id. at 1421.
See generally THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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(2002).
205.
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CNN

(Mar.
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2003,

11:05
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http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/1 9/sprj.irq.int.bush.transcript.
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such a right arises only if the "threatened attack is imminent, no other
207
means would deflect it and the action is proportionate."
In justifying the threat of force or actual use of force in Syria, President Obama did not explicitly use the Bush Doctrine to justify an armed
attack in Syria, but he did focus on the threat of Syria's chemical weapons use to national security. 208 Although not a direct threat to U.S. borders, he argued chemical weapons could be transferred to terrorist groups
that later could harm the American people. 209 Moreover, inaction would
cause other tyrants to acquire and use chemical weapons on the battlefield, potentially harming American soldiers.210 Another danger is. the
211
risk to U.S. allies nearby, including Turkey, Jordan, and Israel.
gional stability is threatened when these "internal" events lead to refugee
migrations, armed conflicts that spill over borders, scarcity of regional
2 12
Simiresources, and transnational environmental and health problems.
larly, President Trump, while stating that the chemical weapons attack
,213
also used national security as a justificawas a "disgrace to humanity,"
tion for the missile attack, stating: "It is in this vital national security of
the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons. . . . As a result, the refugee crisis continues to deepen, and
the region continues to destabilize, threatening the United States and its
allies."2 14
The type of self-defense the United States alleged could perhaps be
found valid, but it is not the type of self-defense referred to in the U.N.
Charter that grants a state the right to attack. Article 51 applies to a country's retaliation from a direct attack, whereas President Trump's use of
self-defense is preemptive.215 Perhaps the United States could have met
the second and third prong required by the Secretary-General (no alterna207.
High Level Panel, supra note 100, 1 188. The Secretary-General maintained, however,
that if a state has objective evidence of an anticipated attack, it must still seek approval from the
Security Council because allowing one state to conduct a unilateral preemptive attack allows for
more illegal uses of force. See id. IT 190-91. Two criteria-necessity and proportionality-for the
use of preemptive military force arose in the infamous Caroline case. In 1837, when Canada was
under British rule, the British burned a U.S. ship that was providing assistance to anti-British, Canadian rebels, claiming that it was acting in self-defense. See Anthony Clark Arend, InternationalLaw

and the Preemptive Use ofMilitary Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 90-91 (2003).
208.

Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 187, at 1.

209.
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211.
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Scheffer, supra note 38, at 287.

213.

Syria War: US Weighs Military Action Following Gas 'Attack', BBC (Apr. 7, 2017),

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39522312.
Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper & Michael D. Shear, Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air
214.
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TIMES

(Apr.

6,

2017),

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-tosyrian-chemical-attack.html; Anthony Capaccio, Illya Arkhipov, & Kambiz Foroohar, Trump's Syria
Missile Strike Ramps Up Tensions with Moscow, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 8, 2017, 2:45 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-07/u-s-launches-missile-strike-on-syria-inresponse-to-gas-attack.
See Akande, supra note 160.
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tive means and proportionate action), but it is unlikely that the United
States could justify an anticipatory attack because a threat to U.S. borders was not imminent. Nor does the Article allow retaliation as selfdefense when an ally is attacked. Thus, to strike Syria, the United States
could not do so legally under Article 51. Accordingly, an attack on Syria
could not be justified under collection action or self-defense. All that
remains then as a legal doctrine is the responsibility to protect.
V.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT

In 2013, President Obama addressed the American people regarding
his proposed military strike and stated:
What message will we send if a dictator can gas hundreds of children
to death in plain sight and pay no price? What's the purpose of the international system that we've built if a prohibition on the use of
chemical weapons . . is not enforced? . .. Out of the ashes of world
war, we built an international order and enforced the rules that gave it
meaning. And we did so because we believe that the rights of individuals to live in peace and dignity depends on the responsibilities of
-216
nations.
This statement reflects the idea behind humanitarian intervention. In
the face of gross human rights violations, the international community
has a responsibility to protect the victims and to prevent further abuses of
power.217 As such, a country may be permitted to act without authorization from the Security Council and not in self-defense under the emerging exception to the nonintervention doctrine from Articles 2(4)218 and
2(7) of the U.N. Charter. 219 The exception holds weight in that the intervention is directed neither toward the "territorial integrity" nor "political
independence" of the targeted state,220 the two main reasons why the use

of force is prohibited. The debate centers on whether humanitarian inter-

216.
Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 187, at 2.
217.
ICISS, supra note 37, at VIII.
218.
See Koh, supranote 170. Professor Koh suggests that the "use of the word 'other' leaves
open whether Article 2(4) would permit a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of a
state, in a case where that threat or action was critical or essential to effectuate the U.N.'s purposes."
Id. (citing U.N. Charter art. 2(4) which states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations") (emphasis
added).
219.
ICISS, supra note 37, at VIII.
220.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 222. Pro-

fessor Simma objects to this theory because it contradicts the purpose of Article 2(4): to prevent
armed force. See id. He discusses the prevailing legal view that forcible humanitarian intervention
cannot be justified under the U.N. Charter because the validity of the Articles is not conditioned on
the effectiveness of collective action to protect against humanitarian atrocities. Id. at 222-23.
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vention intrudes on the political independence of the state, or whether
22 1
human rights are matters beyond a state's domestic jurisdiction.
ICISS defined the responsibility to protect as "the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe-from mass murder and rape, from starvation-but that
when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be
2 22
It explained that this reborne by the broader community of states."
sponsibility overrides nonintervention when a population is suffering
serious harm-from civil war, repression, or state failure-and the home
223
In other words, a
state is either unwilling or unable to end that harm.
protect its peoto
it
fails
when
sovereignty
to
right
its
abrogates
state
224
and proprevention
international
accept
to
"When a State refuses
ple.
to
relating
violations
tection assistance, commits egregious crimes and
the responsibility to protect and fails to respond to less coercive
measures, it is, in effect, challenging the international community to live
225 By becoming a signatory of the
up to its own responsibilities ...
United Nations, the state "accepts the responsibilities of membership
flowing from that signature. There is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal func226
tions and external duties."
To be clear, the responsibility to protect is not a catchall doctrine
that permits a state to invade another for no reason. The doctrine may be
invoked only as a last resort where collective action cannot be obtained
and for those types of suffering that are fundamentally against wellestablished human rights norms.2 27 The United Nations recognized this
principle, explaining that states do not have a "right to intervene" but
rather a "responsibility to protect" individuals whose state cannot or will
not protect them.228 Furthermore, the doctrine's use is narrowed by the
ICISS framework.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has early philosophical
roots. Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, one of the founders of international
law, believed the law should include an exception for humanitarian intervention. 229 He wrote:

221.

Ocran, supra note 35, at 15.

222.
223.
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Id. at XI.

224.
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What ofImplementation?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 290 (2006).

156.

225.

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164,
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Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were formed,
the ruler of each claimed some especial right over his subjects . . . but
if a tyrant . . . practices atrocities towards his subjects which no just
man can approve, the right of human social connection is not cut off
in such case.230

E.R.N. Arntz echoed that idea, stating:
When a government, even acting within the limits of its right of sovereignty, violates the rights of humanity, either by measures contrary
to the interests of other [s]tates, or by excessive injustice or brutality,
which seriously injure our morals or civilization, the right of intervention is legitimate. For, however worthy of respect the rights of
sovereignty and independence of states may be, there is something
even more worthy of respect, namely the law of humanity or of human society that must not be violated. 23 1

The African Union (AU) is the only regional organization that has
enshrined this doctrine within its founding charter. Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union specifically provides for "[t]he
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity ... ."232 The AU later adopted the
Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act, which amended Article

4(h) by adding to the end of the Article "as well as a serious threat to
legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the
Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council." 233
The AU inserted a right to intervene into its charter after the failures of

the region to respond to various genocides and atrocities in Africa, such
as the genocide under Idi Amin in Uganda in the 1970s and in Rwanda in
1994.2 There was growing criticism that surrounding countries had
watched idly as gross human rights violations occurred and chose not to
intervene based on the principles of sovereignty.23 5

230.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting HUGONIS GROTH, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS LIBRI
TRES 439-40 (William Whewell trans. 1853)).
231.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rorin-Jacquemyms, Note Sur La Theorie du Droit
d'Intervention, 8 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 675 (1876)); see
also DAVIDE RODOGNO, AGAINST MASSACRE: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE, 1815-1914, at 55 (2011).
232.
Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3, 37.
233.
Ben Kioko, The Right of Intervention Under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From
Non-Interference to Non-Intervention, 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 807, 807 (2003). Mr. Kioko, a legal
adviser to the African Union, explained in his article that this provision to the Constitutive Act was
added in order to give the AU the "necessary flexibility in deciding on intervention" after many
delegations pointed out that the threshold for intervention was too high and excluded too many
situations that threatened national and regional peace and security. Id. at 812.
234.
Id. at 812.
235.
Id. at 812-13.
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The AU is technically required to seek permission from the United
Nations to intervene under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter. 236 However,
the AU has shown on prior occasions that it is willing to defy the United
Nations and forgo the "legal niceties such as the authorization of the Security Council." 237 Based on this law, the Eastern African Region coun-

tries intervened without Security Council approval in Burundi in 1996
where the AU imposed trade and economic sanctions on the country after
238
a coup d'6tat that assassinated the democratically elected president.
The actions of the AU and explicit adoption of the doctrine indicate a
clear emerging practice of the use of humanitarian intervention, or "nonindifference,"2 39 where core international crimes against humanity have
occurred.
The doctrine is perhaps becoming more widely accepted as more in240
NATO
stances occur over time that require this type of intervention.
invaded Kosovo without Security Council permission to end the conflict
between the Serbian military and Kosovar Albanian forces, usinq humanitarian necessity to prevent genocide as the primary rationale. 41 Other
examples include Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, which forced out
communist Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime from power in Phnom
242
and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979 to overthrow dictaPenh,
243
tor Idi Amin, whose reign led to the deaths of over 300,000 people.

236.

Id. at 820; U.N. Charter art. 53.

Kioko, supra note 233, at 821. Kioko adds that the AU will likely have to call upon the
237.
U.N. and request its assistance because it will be unable to meet the massive financial, logistical, and
military demands of an intervention. Id. at 822.

238.
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Id. at 821, 821 n.38.
Id. at 819.

240.

Yassin El-Ayouty, InternationalAction on the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention:

The Case of Southern Iraq (1991-1992), N.Y. ST. B.J., Aug. 1996, at 12, 17 (1996); see also THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 226. Professor Simma
suggests that a rule of customary international law may develop over time as more instances occur
whereby countries intervene in situations of gross humanitarian violations without Security Council
approval. But he argues that if that occurs, the Security Council should extend its Chapter VII practice to such human rights violations, rather than creating a completely new customary law. Id.
241.
ICISS, supra note 34, ¶ 2.25; NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NATO,
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last updated July 15, 1999); Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo, SURVIVAL, Autumn 1999, at 102, 102. At the time, National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger identified three criteria that enabled the U.S. to enter Kosovo: (1) presence of
genocide or ethnic cleansing, (2) U.S. must have the capacity to act, and (3) U.S. must have a national interest at stake. Brown, supra note 147, at 1692. But professor Jack Goldsmith argues that
Kosovo should not even be used as precedent because the U.S. had not accepted humanitarian intervention as the justification for the invasion. Jack Goldsmith, The Kosovo Precedentfor Syria Isn't
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The United States also used the doctrine to explain its invasion into Iraq
in 1990 in the aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. 2 44

Additionally, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)2 45 used the doctrine to justify intervention in Liberia and
Sierra Leone.246 The situation in Liberia involved the bloody clash between six ethnic groups that escalated into a massive civil war causing
200,000 casualties, 800,000 refugees, and about a million internally dis247
placed residents.
After the United Nations failed to take any action,
ECOWAS decided to intervene without Security Council approval for
the following reasons: (1) the extent of the violence affected Liberians
and other nationals from ECOWAS countries; (2) neighboring states
were bearing the huge burden of taking in the largest group of refugees
in West Africa; and (3) ECOWAS "shared a collective responsibility of
'ensuring that peace and stability is maintained within the sub-region and
in the African Continent as a whole, for ECOWAS believes that the tragic situation in Liberia poses a threat to international peace and security."' 248 The United States supported this intervention and drafted Security Council Resolution 788 that declared the deteriorating situation in
Liberia "a threat to international peace and security" and welcomed "the
continued commitment of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) to and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the
Liberian conflict[.]" 2 4 9 Resolution 788 further recognized the requests
from ECOWAS to dispatch U.N. groups to observe "the encampment
and disarmament of warring parties" and "to verify and monitor the electoral process" and commended and encouraged ECOWAS "to continue
its efforts to assist in the peaceful implementation of this Accord[.]" 250
The Security Council adopted this Resolution, among others, thereby
legitimizing the legality of ECOWAS' actions, including ECOWAS'
petroleum and arms embargoes against Liberia.25 1
Libya is another example in which the responsibility to protect was
used to justify a military invasion and was actually the first use of force
with this rationale endorsed by the Security Council. Inspired by the uprisings in the Arab Spring, Libyan civilians began protesting the regime
of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who used force and violence against his
244.

Ocran, supra note 35, at 2.

245.
ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975. Treaty of the Economic
Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 1010 U.N.T.S. 17.
246.
ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 2.25.
247.

Binaifer Nowrojee, Joining Forces. United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping-Lessons

from Liberia, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 129, 133-34 (1995).
248. Id. at 135 (quoting ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Final Communiqud of the
FirstSession, Doc. 54 (Aug. 7, 1990)).
249.
S.C. Res. 788, at 1-2 (Nov. 19, 1992); Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, U.S. Supportfor Multinational Intervention in Liberia, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (2004).

250.

S.C. Res. 788, at 2 (Nov. 19, 1992).

251.
Levitt, supra note 149, at 366; see also IKECHI MGBEOJI, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE
LIBERIAN CRISIS, UNILATERALISM, AND GLOBAL ORDER 115 (2003).
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opposition.25 2 The protests, which began in small spurts in February
2011, escalated quickly and led to the deaths of an estimated 30,000 people, the wounding of 50,000, and the disappearance of over 4,000.253 The
United States and Russia denounced Gaddafi, but politicians in each
country expressed concern over intervening because of the long-term
stakes in the oil-rich region.25 4 On February 25, 2011, the United States
froze Libyan assets. 255 The next day, with backing from the Arab League,
the Security Council adopted a resolution demanding an end to the vio256
lence in Libya and imposing sanctions.26 When Gaddafi failed to heed to
these demands, the Security Council adopted another resolution on
March 17, 2011, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorizing U.N.
members to take "all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians" and
257
halt violence.

This was the first time in history the Security Council endorsed mil258
The United
itary action under the "responsibility to protect" doctrine.
States and NATO used this authorization to launch a bombing campaign
over the country, eventually leading to the assassination of Gaddafi by
rebels and the end of the intervention in October 2011.259 Because Gaddafi was ousted, this bombing campaign was highly criticized as a means
to enforce a regime change, a purpose prohibited by ICISS.260 This criticism is discussed further in the "Responsibility to React" Section below,
but the framework ICISS has created should prevent these types of military interventions for a regime change and not for a "just cause."
Over time, as the Security Council begins to endorse further actions
under the responsibility to protect doctrine, the doctrine may perhaps
Karin Laub, Libyan Estimate: At Least 30,000 Died in the War, CNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 8,
252.
2011, 3:50 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/libyan-estimate-least-30000-died-war.

253.

Id.

David Usbome, Russia Slams 'No-Fly Zone' Plan as Cracks Appear in Libya Strategy,
254.
INDEPENDENT (March 2, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/russia-slams2
nofly-zone-plan-as-cracks-appear-in-libya-strategy-22296 1.html; Arab League Backs Libya No-Fly
http://www.news24.com/World/News/Arab-LeaguePM),
7:51
7,
2013,
Zone, NEWS24, (March

backs-Libya-no-fly-zone-20110307.
2011 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya255.
civil-war-fast-facts (last updated Mar. 29, 2017, 4:38 PM).
S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 1, 9-17 (Feb. 26, 2011).
256.
S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011).
257.
Upon the unanimous adoption of the Resolution 1970, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki258.
moon expressed "hope that the message that 'gross violations of basic human rights will not be
tolerated and that those responsible for grave crimes will be held accountable' would be 'heard and
heeded' by the Libyan regime and that it would bring hope and relief to those still at risk." Meetings
Coverage, Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures
on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters,
SC/10187/REV.1 (Feb. 26, 2011). The representative from France stated that the "resolution recalled
the accountability of each State for the protection of its population and the role of the international
community when that responsibility was not met." Id. The Libyan representative "thanked Council
Members for their unanimous action, which represented moral support for his people, who were
resisting the attacks." Id.
See 2011 Libya Civil War FastFacts, supra note 255.
259.

260.

African Leaders Oppose NATO over Gaddafi, NEWVISION (June 18, 2011, 3:00 AM),

http://www.newvision.co.ug/new
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become part of customary international law. 261 But a few hurdles remain
before it can assume that label, namely that customary law usually does
not override treaty law.262 Accepting the idea that the responsibility to
protect is international customary law necessitates accepting the premise
that it has overridden other established international laws, including Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which states that a rule of jus cogens,
like the nonuse of force, can be modified only by another rule of jus cogens, and Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, stating that Charter prevails
over other treaty obligations. 263 Once the doctrine becomes customary
law, it can more easily navigate around the provisions in the U.N. Charter. But the journey to that point is still far away.
The dilemma surrounding humanitarian intervention is complex. If
an outside state takes no action, then it becomes a complicit bystander.264
But if a state intervenes, it may not be successful in mitigating the of265
fenses.
Furthermore, intervening could mean taking a side in a civil
conflict, which could cause further state fragmentation.266 For example,
Interventions in the Balkans did manage to reduce the civilian death
toll, but it has yet to produce a stable state order in the region. As
both the Kosovo and Bosnian interventions show, even when the goal
of international action is, as it should be, protecting ordinary human
beings from gross and systematic abuse, it can be difficult to avoid
doing rather more harm than good. 267
However, the doctrine has been criticized as highly susceptible to
268
abuse2.
States would, the argument goes, use humanitarianism as a
guise to intervene for nonaltruistic purposes, such as expansionism or
overthrow of government. 269 Nothing would prevent states from using
force against another for an easy-to-fabricate reason.270 For example, in
1938, Adolf Hitler justified the use of force in Czechoslovakia as humanitarian intervention to protect the German nationals living there from
being

261.
In order to become a "custom," two elements need to be met: state practice (usus) and a
belief that such practice is required (opinion juris sive necessitatis). Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27 (June 3) ("It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris

of States ....

).

262.

See Akande, supra note 161.

263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
ICISS, supra note 37,
Id.
Id.

¶

1.22.

267.
Id.
268.
Ocran, supra note 35, at 13.
269.
Dino Kritsiotis, ReappraisingPolicy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1005, 1020-21 (1998).
270.
Id. at 1021 (citing Louis Henkin, Remarks on Biafra, Bengal, and Beyond: International
Responsibility and Genocidal Conflict, 66 PROC. AM. SOCY INT'L L. 95, 96 (1972)).

U.S. INTERVENTION IN SYRIA

2017]

51

maltreated in the unworthiest manner, tortured, . . . [and denied] the
right of nations to self-determination," that "[i]n a few weeks the
number of refugees who have been driven out has risen to over
120,000," that "the security of more than 3,000,000 human beings"
was in jeopardy, and that the German government was "determined
by one means or another to terminate these attempts ... to deny by
dilatory methods the legal claims of oppressed peoples.
But countries trying to do real good should not be prevented from
doing so just because of the possibility that a different country could use
272
Judge Rosalyn Higgins, the first
the doctrine for an improper purpose.
female judge and former president of the International Court of Justice,
likens this idea to that of self-defense:
Many writers do argue against the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention today. They make much of the fact that in the past the right
has been abused. It undoubtedly has. But then so have there been
countless abusive claims to the right to self-defense. That does not
lead us to say that there should be no right of self-defense today. We
must face the reality that we live in a decentralized international legal
order, where claims may be made either in good faith or abusively.
We delude ourselves if we think that the role of norms is to remove
the possibility of abusive claims ever being made.273
A balance must be struck between the sovereignty of states and the
imperatives of humanitarianism. Achieving this balance and ensuring the
lack of abuse is not a simple or easy endeavor and will be discussed further below in the "Right Intention" Section under the "Responsibility to
React."
Another argument is that intervention will drastically affect the do274
And
mestic country's political process and organization of the state.
But
as
another pits humanitarian intervention against state sovereignty.
the former Secretary-General has suggested, sovereignty goes hand-in275
hand with the responsibility to protect. 2 In his 2009 report "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect," he explained that respect for human
rights is an essential part of being a responsible sovereign 276 and that
Goodman, supra note 178, at 113 (alterations in original) (quoting Letter from Reich
271.
Chancellor Hitler to Prime Minister Chamberlain (Sept. 23,1938), in THE CRISIS IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-OCTOBER 31, 1938, 19 INT'L CONCILIATION 433 (1938)); Kritsiotis,
supranote 269, at 1021 (citing Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention By Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 284 (1973)). However, a
state's use of force to protect its own nationals is often justified under self-defense because the
doctrine is much clearer; for example, Israel used self-defense to explain its raid of the Entebbe
airport in Uganda to rescue Israeli and Jewish hostages. Brown, supra note 147, at 1703-04.
Ocran, supra note 35, at 26.
272.
Kritsiotis, supranote 269, at 1022 (quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
273.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 247 (1994)).
Ocran, supranote 35, at 16.
274.
U.N. Secretary-General, supranote 164, T 16.
275.

276.

Id.
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sovereignty itself is a responsibility. 277 "By helping States to meet their
core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to
strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed,
not just to react when they fail . . . ."278 The ICJ in Nicaraguav. United
States stated that "[t]he principle of non-intervention involves the right of
every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference;
though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the
court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international
law."279
The Secretary-General suggested a three-pillar, interrelated analysis
of the responsibility to protect: "[t]he protection responsibilities of the
[s]tate," "[i]nternational assistance and capacity building," and "[t]imely
and decisive response." 2 80 This analysis, however, does not provide specific guidance for a state wanting to take unilateral action against another
state whose own leadership is responsible for the human rights violation. 281 ICISS came up with a framework to analyze the humanitarian
intervention doctrine so that it could be effectively used only for the correct purposes.282 This framework also includes some of the elements discussed in the three-pillar analysis. As framed by ICISS, the responsibility
to protect includes the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild.2 83 Stated differently, the responsibility to protect includes peacemaking, peace enforcement, and postconflict peacebuilding.2 84 The next
Sections of this Article will consider each of these criteria in turn.
A. Responsibility to Prevent
ICISS defined the responsibility to prevent as "address[ing] both the
root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made
crises putting populations at risk."285 This responsibility lies primarily
with the sovereign state and with the organizations within it. 286 International support then serves to bolster this prevention through development

277.
278.

Id. I 10(a).
Id.

279.

Ocran, supra note 35, at 14-15 (alteration in original) (quoting Military and Paramilitary

Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27)).
280.

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164,

¶

II (a)-(c).

281.
If the political leadership of the State is determined to commit crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect, then assistance measures under pillar two would be of
little use and the international community would be better advised to begin assembling
the capacity and will for a "timely and decisive" response.

Id. 1 29.
282.
ICISS, supra note 37, at VIII.
283.
Id. ¶2.32.
284.

Ocran, supra note 35, at 4.

285.
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ICISS, supra note 37, at XI.
Id.¶3.2.
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assistance, local initiatives, mediation, and efforts to promote reconciliation. 287
Prevention efforts must be exhausted before contemplating inter28
vention.288 The main idea is as follows:
[T]he earlier the root causes of a potential conflict are identified and
effectively addressed, the more likely it is that the parties to a conflict
will be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue, address the actual
grievances that lie at the root of the potential conflict and refrain
289
from the use of force to achieve their aims.
These efforts must include both short- and long-term measures involving the political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and institutional spheres
of the sovereign, regional, and international actors.2 90
Conflict prevention is one of the United Nations' primary responsibilities. 29 Article 1(1) of the U.N. Charter specifically mandates that the
United Nations "take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace . . . .,,292 In the 2001 U.N. Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, the Secretary-General stated, "[C]ollective
security should imply an obligation for all of us to strive to address tensions, grievances, inequality, injustice, intolerance and hostilities at the
293
earliest stage possible, before peace and security are endangered."
The United Nations has recognized the importance of prevention
methods. In 2000, it published the Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations, in which it laid out suggestions for better long-term
294
The report stated that U.N.
peace operations that prevent conflicts.
295
peace operations addressed only one-third of the conflicts in the 1990s.
Most of the funds were used for intervention and postintervention assistance; according to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, about $200 billion was spent on conflict interventions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia
and El Salvador, when the United Nations could have saved $130 billion

if it took effective preventative steps.296

ICISS puts forth three essential conditions that must be met to
achieve effective prevention. First is "early warning," knowledge of a
287.
288.

Id. 13.3.
Id. 13.4.

289.

U.N. Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/55/985-

S/2001/574 (June 7, 2001).
Id. at 2.
290.
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U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
292.
293.

U.N. Secretary General, supranote 289, ¶ 19.

Rep. of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809
294.
(Aug. 21, 2000).
Id. T 29.
295.
ICISS, supra note 37, 1 3.7.
296.
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dangerous situation, its fragility, and its risks.297 Investigating these
crimes through on-site missions is just one way of discovering the degree
of harm or potential harm. 298 Second is the "preventive toolbox," comprehensive understanding of all the policy measures that can be taken to
diffuse the situation.299 Finally, the "political will" actually to apply those
measures must be present.3 00
Here, all three elements existed that could have effectuated preventative measures before Syria used chemical weapons. The United Nations
certainly had "early warning" as to the fragile situation developing in
Syria. The Syrian conflict began in 2011, and the amount of violence and
number of deaths continued to increase as time went by. This understanding is expressed in the two resolutions the Security Council adopted
in April 2012, condemning the violence and noting that Syria had begun
to implement its commitments to cease fire. 301 Moreover, the United Nations deployed a mission to investigate allegations of the small-scale use
of chemical weapons prior to and after the 2013 chemical weapons attack.

302

But as the hostility intensified, those resolutions meant nothing, and
further action needed to be taken to curb the violence. Multiple countries,
including the United States, repeatedly submitted proposals to the Security Council to stop the ensuing violence before it escalated even further,
but they were all vetoed.303 These proposals included measures that constituted the "preventive toolbox" and that would be implemented by the
Security Council and various U.N. bodies and regional organizations.
One such proposal from October 2011 led by France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom condemned the violence and urged Syria to halt its
assault on civilians. 3 04 The proposal also demanded that Syria comply
with its international law obligations and called for an inclusive political
process that addressed the public's concerns.305 But Russia and China
vetoed the resolution.3 06 Another proposal from the United States in February 2012 condemned the Syrian government's gross human rights violations and its use of force against civilians.3 07 It demanded an end to the
violence and called for Syria's cooperation with regional organizations to
promote peace and stability in the region. 3 08 But once again, Russia and
13.9.

297.

Id.

298.

U.N. Secretary-General, supranote 164,

299.
300.
301.

ICISS, supra note 37, 1 3.9.
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S.C. Res. 2043 (Apr. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2042 (Apr. 14, 2012).
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China vetoed it. 30 9 In July 2012, the United Kingdom and United States
again proposed a resolution to the Security Council, expressing grave
concern about the escalating violence and death toll and condemning
Syria's use of heavy weaponry, including tanks and helicopters indiscriminately to shell civilian populations. 31 0 The resolution also included a
six-point plan to facilitate the political transition and ease humanitarian
violations. 3 11 This proposal was, yet again, vetoed by Russia and China. 3 12 These proposals led or cosponsored by the Unites States indicate
that it had the "political will" to carry out measures against Syria.
With the Security Council deadlocked, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution in May 2013, three months before Syria's use of
chemical weapons, encouraging the Security Council to take effective
The resolution also demeasures to stop the violence in the Syria.
manded that Syria strictly observe its international law obligations not to
use or transfer chemical weapons.3 14 This is the most blatant evidence of
the United Nations' understanding of the possibility of chemical weapons use.
ICISS stated that collective, international preventative measures
must be exhausted before intervention-especially through military
force-may be undertaken. 315 That is exactly what happened here. Former National Security Advisor Susan Rice stated that the overall U.S.
policy for Syria (not the military strike itself) involves this peace-making
agenda: "[T]o end the underlying conflict through a negotiated, political
transition in which Assad leaves power. The best way to achieve this is
to keep the country and its institutions intact, but all parties have to be
willing to negotiate." 316 The United States and other states tried to take
preventative action through the Security Council, but their efforts were
blocked.317 President Obama addressed this very point in his statement to
the American people about his plan for Syria: "Over the last two years,
my administration has tried diplomacy and sanctions, warning and negotiations-but chemical weapons were still used by the Assad regime." 318
President Trump said that repeated pleas with the United Nations had
failed.3 19

309.

Security Council - Veto List, supra note 190.

310.
311.

S.C. Res. 538, at 1-3 (July 19, 2012).
Id. 1 3; see also S.C. Res. 2042 annex (Apr. 14, 2012).

312.
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313.
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G.A. Res. 67/262,19 (June 4, 2013).
Id. I11.
ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 3.1.

Susan E. Rice, Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security
316.
Advisor Susan E. Rice (Sept. 9, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/09/09/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice).
Fassihi, Nicholas & Winning, supra note 60; CBS NEWS, supra note 31.
317.
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Remarks by the President, supra note 32.
See Starr & Diamond, supra note 193.
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The United States attempted to fulfill its responsibility to prevent.
Because every preventative measure was attempted and blocked, it could
do no more and could enter the "responsibility to react" phase only outside of the U.N. framework. The United States, as a world economic
power, has the capacity to enter and fulfill the next phase.320
B. Responsibility to React
ICISS described the responsibility to react as the responsibility "to
respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate
measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention." 321 The
Commission stated that countries must first seek Security Council authorization prior to carrying out any military intervention. 322 This is in
part because nonintervention is always the starting point, for sovereign
states must be allowed the opportunity to resolve the issues within their
domestic sphere. 323 But, as discussed in Part III above, it is difficult to
get this authorization because of the permanent members' veto power.
Consequently, as Professor David Scheffer suggests, when the Security
Council is deadlocked, a state or group of states must act outside of the
U.N. Charter and be guided by the ICISS framework for humanitarian
intervention.3 24
When a state is either unable or unwilling to address the harm, and
when international prevention efforts have failed, humanitarian intervention may be required.32 5 The General Assembly reiterated this notion
through its resolution in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, stating that
force may be used "should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." 326 Humanitarian intervention is the exception to nonintervention, an exception
that exists for circumstances where domestic disputes spill over into the
international realm, causing disruption to the region, and also where
327
gross human rights violations are occurring.
Military action is allowed, but only in extreme and grave cases. 328
These cases of violence must "so genuinely 'shock the conscience of
320.
The United States' powerful position in the world alone does not justify a unilateral attack
on another state. Rather, its economic and political stature ensures, or at least makes it more likely,
that it can be successful in carrying out a limited attack and then providing funds to rebuild any
damage it creates, as will be discussed further below.
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mankind"' or present a profoundly "clear and present danger to international security" to permit the use of military force. 329 Such cases arise
when broken-down states and civil conflicts become so violent and repressive that citizens are faced with actual or potential large-scale genocide, massacre, or ethnic cleansing. 330 ICISS further elaborates on how
this level is measured in the "just cause" analysis below. These types of
interventions have occurred in the past, primarily due to the Security
Council's failure to act where gross humanitarian violations are present
and the need for assistance is overwhelming. 331 "[I]n the face of a conscience shocking situation but inaction by the Council, it is not a stretch
of legal reasoning to say that the responsibility to protect admits of a
3 32
narrowly tailored right of ad hoc action for a proper purpose."
To ensure that these military interventions are not abused, ICISS
created a narrow framework that ought to be followed in assessing
whether a country can lawfully use military force against another. There
are six elements for intervention: (1) right authority, (2) just cause, (3)
right intention, (4) last resort, (5) proportional means, and (6) reasonable
prospects.

333

1. Right Authority
ICISS stated that Security Council authorization must first be
sought prior to any military intervention. 334 It also stated that the permanent members should agree not to use their veto in matters that do not
affect their national interests, but where the intervention would greatly
ease the violations.33 5 But practically speaking, even if the permanent
members did make this agreement, it is highly unlikely to prevent the
veto from being used. Here, Russia is one of Syria's strongest allies,
336
Russia could aseven providing the country with Russian weaponry.
its own domeshurt
also
would
Syria
against
taken
sert that a resolution
In an op-ed
proposal.
tic interests and therefore it can rightfully veto the
to the New York Times, Russian President Vladimir Putin asserted that
any action taken without Security Council approval would plainly violate
the U.N. Charter, stating, "We are not protecting the Syrian government,
but international law. . . . It is alarming that military intervention in in-

329.
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336.
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ternal conflicts in foreign countries has become commonplace for the
United States. Is it in America's long-term interest? I doubt it." 33 7
ICISS partly recognized the veto problem and suggested that a
country seeking to intervene should look to the General Assembly and
then to regional organizations for assistance.338 In the case of Libya, the
African Union, Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Organization of the Islamic Conference all supported the condemnation of Gaddafi. 339 The regional support certainly helps, but it also takes time. These
situations often require immediate action, and acquiring approval from
these other large organizations could waste precious time. ICISS also
warned the Security Council that if it fails to take action, states wishing
to intervene may do so on their own, an action which would affect the
credibility of the United Nations as a peace-keeping organization. 3 40 That
is why, as a practical matter, if the Security Council is unwilling to authorize military intervention, a state may do so without its approval if all
the other elements for intervention are present. 34 1
Moreover, instances have occurred in which action has been taken
legally without Chapter VII authorization. For example, the forcible policing of no-fly zones in Iraq in 1999 by the United States, United Kingdom, and France lacked Security Council approval under Chapter VII.3 42
Though the Security Council did pass resolution 688 to condemn the
suffering of Iraqi civilians, the resolution was not passed under Chapter
VH. 343 Thus, the Security Council did not authorize the policing actions
under the Charter but rather under a humanitarian intervention principle.
Regarding Syria, the United Kingdom proposed a resolution to the
U.N. Security Council in 2013 seeking its authorization for military ac345
tion, but the members could not agree to its terms.
Because the proposal failed, no official record exists of whether the United States cosponsored it. But it is reasonable to assume that the United States supported the U.K.'s proposal based on their allied relationship. 34 6 The
337.
338.

Putin, supranote 47.
ICISS, supra note 37, In 6.29--3 1.

339.

Justin Morris, Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum, 89 INT'L

AFF. 1265, 1272 (2013); Ved P. Nanda, From Paralysis in Rwanda to Bold Moves in Libya: Emergence of the "Responsibilityto Protect"Norm Under InternationalLaw - Is the InternationalCom-

munity Ready for It?, 34 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (2011).
340.
ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 6.40; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, T
("[T]he international community's failure to stem the mass violence and displacements in Darfur,
well as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, has undermined public confidence
the United Nations and our collective espousal of the principles relating to the responsibility
protect.").

341.

Scheffer, supra note 38, at 290-91.

342.

See Bethlehem, supra note 172.

343.
344.
345.
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See Fassihi, Nicholas & Winning, supra note 60.
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countries then came together again in condemning the attacks in April
34 7
Under the
2017 and urging Russia not to block any U.N. actions.
right
authority.
of
element
ICISS framework, this is enough to satisfy the
2. Just Cause
Military intervention can be justified only if the circumstances in
the sovereign state so grossly violate human rights and cause "serious
and irreparable harm" to human beings.348 Professor Scheffer identifies a
number of elements as requiring intervention: "(1) [t]o rescue or protect
citizens abroad . . . whose lives are at risk[;] (2) [t]o protect religious or
ethnic minorities from genocide or violent oppression[;] (3) to [stop]
internal . . . human rights atrocities[;] (4) [t]o contain mass migration,"
assist internally displaced people, and to improve life-threatening conditions for refugees; (5) to curtail gross human suffering from "man-made
or natural disasters"; and (6) to aid oppressed rebels in their fight for
349
self-determination against tyrants who grossly violate human rights.
ICISS stated that this harm must be either (1) "large scale loss of
life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to
act, or a failed state situation," or (2) "large scale 'ethnic cleansing,' actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion,
acts of terror or rape."350 Such loss includes crimes against humanity and
war violations as defined by the Geneva Conventions and other interna351
tional laws.

ICISS did not define "large scale" in numbers but stated that intervention can be anticipatory when clear evidence exists of the likelihood
of mass killing.3 52 If countries could not act on this likelihood, they
would have to wait until a human rights violation rose to the level of
mass genocide.3 53 Even so, some extreme humanitarian violations to a
smaller population may warrant the same intervention.354
The Commission listed a number of circumstances that would not
meet the "just cause" requirement for military intervention: systematic
racial discrimination, systematic imprisonment, repression of political
opponents, overthrow of government, rescuing own nationals on foreign

Down to Assad, supra note 6; The Latest, supra note 14.
347.
ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 4.18; see also Scheffer, supra note 38, at 291.
348.
Scheffer, supra note 38, at 265. But Professor Scheffer notes the problem with this list: all
349.
purposes are difficult to justify under a traditional reading of the U.N. Charter. These purposes, he
argues, can be addressed using non-consensual, non-forcible methods, which include the work of
non-governmental organizations that provide aid, rather than military force. See id. at 266.

¶ 4.19

350.
351.
352.
353.

ICISS, supranote 37,
Id.14.20.
Id. 14.21.
Id.

354.

Ocran, supranote 35, at 45.

(emphasis omitted).
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soil (covered by U.N. Charter Article 51), and responding to terrorist
attacks (also covered by Article 5 1).
Syria's use of chemical weapons clearly fits the just cause requirement because the attack caused large scale loss of life to adults and children. The U.N. Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in 2004 specifically stated that chemical weapons are
similar to nuclear weapons in that they pose a serious threat for their
ability to indiscriminately kill masses with one shot.356 The SecretaryGeneral's report on the U.N.'s chemical weapons investigation even stated that "chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in numerous casualties . . . ."35 The Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights confirmed at least 502 deaths and thousands more injured in
2013.358 The April 2017 attacks killed about 100 and left hundreds more
injured. 35 9 Furthermore, because Syria had huge stockpiles of the weapons, 360 the intervention could be further justified as anticipating more
deaths.
3. Right Intention
"The primary purpose of the intervention," whatever other motives
intervening states may have, "must be to halt or avert human suffering."361 It cannot be, for example, to help a rebel group overthrow a government or to change international borders. 362 It may be difficult to ascertain what the true motivation is, but the intention is better affirmed when
multiple states intend to intervene, or when one state has backing from
regional organizations and support from the victims themselves.363
Realistically, a country is always going to have additional motivations, like economic interests, political strategies, or even expansionism. 3 64 While ideally this should not be so, a state must be able to justify
to its own people the reason for expending the country's resources and

355.
356.
357.
358.

359.
on

ICISS, supranote 37, TT 4.25-27.
High Level Panel, supra note 100, ¶ 114.

U.N. Mission Report, supra note 28, 1 1 (emphasis added).
Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, supra note 29.

Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Nikki Haley Says U.S. May 'Take Our Own Action'
Syrian
Chemical
Attack,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Apr.
5,
2017),

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-un.html;

Lena Masri,

Death Toll in Syrian Chemical Attack Rises to 72, ABC NEWS, (Apr. 5, 2017, 1:36 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/death-toll-syrian-chemical-attack-rises-72/story?id=46591764.
360.
Report of the OPCW, supra note 68.

361.
362.

ICISS, supranote 37, 14.33.
Id.

363.
Id. 14.34; see also Scheffer, supra note 38, at 291.
364.
Ocran, supra note 35, at 44; Kioko, supra note 233, at 823 (areas of interest could include
a desire to prevent cross-border refugee flow or strategic and economic interests in establishing order
in the target state); Amy E. Eckert, The Responsibility to Protect in the Anarchical Society: Power,
Interest, and the Protection of Civilians in Libya and Syria, 41 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 87, 91

(2012).
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taxpayers' money and for taking the risk to intervene.36 5 Though domestic approval is separate and apart from international obligations, leadership will be held accountable domestically for its actions abroad. Therefore, it is natural to have some state interest, other than just a moral one.
These interests, in fact, serve as a check on prolonged interventions and a
compass that keeps the alleged purpose for intervention on the humanitarian path because the intervening state is using its own resources to
intervene. 366 Moreover, because of international interdependence, "international citizenship is a matter of national self-interest." 367 The question
here is not how many intentions the intervening country has but rather
what the primary reason is.
This prong in the analysis is perhaps the highest hurdle to overcome
because it is the most susceptible to abuse.368 How do we know when a
country is being disingenuous? And how do we prevent countries from
taking advantage of the doctrine and using it as a pretext to wage war?
Many leading scholars reject unilateral humanitarian intervention for just
this reason.369 For example, Richard Bilder argues that "historically,
claims of humanitarian intervention have typically served simply as a
pretext for what are, in fact, selfish assertions of national interest, power,
and greed . . . ."370 Similarly, Jane Stromseth, who believes in a gradual
acceptance of the doctrine, asserts that it should not be codified because
that "would provide another theory under which states determined to use
force can seek to justify their actions." 371
Such was the case in Libya. Only France referred to the responsibility to protect during deliberations about the resolutions, but the doctrine's ideals were discussed subsequent to the adoption of the resolu372
The AU, while it condemned Gaddafi, actually opposed the
tions.
resolutions, arguing that intervention in Libya-particularly without AU
approval-would make the situation worse and was not necessary because the situation did not involve genocide; further, the AU believed
that if a regime change were to occur, the Libyan people must make that
decision, not external forces.373 After the NATO bombings, Human

¶ 4.35.

365.

ICISS, supra note 37,

366.
367.
368.

Kritsiotis, supranote 269, at 1026.
ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 4.36; see also Franck, supra note 143, at 857.
See Brown, supra note 146, at 1727; Goodman, supra note 177, at 113; Kritsiotis, supra

note 268, at 1020-23.
See Goodman, supranote 177, at 108-09.
369.
Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism": Promise or Peril?, 9 J.
370.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 160 (1999).
Jane Stromseth, Rethinking HumanitarianIntervention: The Case for Incremental
371.
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 232, 257 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds.,

2003).
See supra, note 258.
372.
African Leaders Oppose NATO Over Gaddafi, supra note 260; see also 2011 Libya Civil
373.
War Fast Facts, supra note 255; see supra note 258. The AU's opposition is particularly important
given the fact that Article 4(h) of the AU's founding charter specifically delineates the right to
intervene in "grave circumstances" like war crimes and genocide. Constitutive Act of the African
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Rights Watch called for an investigation of the campaign, asserting that
the act was illegal and caused far too much collateral damage.37 4 Since
then, during the ten publicly recorded meetings regarding the situation in
Libya between February 2011 and May 2013, express references to the
responsibility to protect were made by the United States, France, Germany, Colombia, France, Lebanon and Rwanda.
President Obama mentioned a number of reasons why he wanted to
strike Syria for its chemical weapons use. He discussed the potential
harm to U.S. allies, the disruption of regional peace from refugee migrations, the spilling of violence across border lines, and national securitythe potential harm that could occur from Syria providing chemical weapons to terrorist groups and other tyrants who could then use the weapons
against U.S. soldiers on the battlefield.376 Clearly, the United States had
many self-interests to intervene. But President Obama also discussed the
attack as "an assault on human dignity" and his primary purpose to "hold
the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemical weapons, deter
this kind of behavior, and degrade their capacity to carry it out." 377 Former President Bill Clinton gave a similar reasoning for the U.S. invasion
of Macedonia in 1999.378 Ms. Rice explained that the strikes on Syria
would not be an attempt to topple President Assad or to effect a change
in regime because that would require a much more extensive military
campaign.379 While the overarching U.S. plan for Syria did include a
peaceful change in government, the narrowness of the strikes indicates
that the action would not likely result in such a change. 380 In Libya,
NATO claimed humanitarian intervention as its justification for action.3
Union, supra note 232, art. 4(h). Its opposition to the resolutions thus indicates that the trigger for
humanitarian intervention is extremely high and the right is highly limited, and the AU believed that
the circumstances in Libya did not reach that bar.

374.

NATO: Investigate Civilian Deaths in Libya, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (May 14, 2012, 12:00

AM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/14.
375.
See Morris, supra note 339, at 1272-73.
376.
Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32; see also U.N. Secretary-General,
supra note 164, 1 58 (stating that special attention must be paid to the prevention of arms flows to
repressive regimes).
377.
Statement by the President on Syria, supranote 32.
378.
William J. Clinton, President of the U.S., Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force
Troops
in
Skopje,
(June
22,
1999)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57770) ("[P]eople who come from different racial and
ethnic and religious backgrounds can live together and work together and do better together if they
simply respect each other's God-given dignity-and we don't want our children to grow up in a 21st
century world where innocent civilians can be hauled off to the slaughter, where children can die en
masse, where young boys of military age can be burned alive, where young girls can be raped en
masse, just to intimidate their families. We don't want our kids to grow up in a world like that....
But never forget, if we can do this here and if we can then say to the people of the world, whether
you live in Africa or central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians
and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and
it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it."); see also Brown, supra note 147, at 1691.
379.
Susan E. Rice, supra note 316.
380.
See Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32.
381.
See NA TO and Libya, NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics 71652.htm (last

updated Nov. 9, 2015).
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The bombing campaign did in fact lead to a regime change, though Gad382
But NATO's strike
dafi was killed by rebel forces, not NATO forces.
3 83
shorter, makmuch
be
would
Syria
on
strike
the
lasted seven months;
had
in
government
ing it much more difficult to achieve such a change
that been the underlying intention. President Trump also cited national
security as a reason for using military force; however, he emphasized
384
and had to be
that Assad's use of chemical weapons was "egregious"
beautiful
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Even
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for
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stopped: "It
child of
No
attack.
barbaric
very
at
this
babies were cruelly murdered
385
God should ever suffer such horror."
4. Last Resort
A country can use military force to intervene only when every other
preventative option for diplomatic resolution of the crisis has been ex386
plored.36 This does not mean that each and every one must have been
tried and failed, but it does mean that each conceivable option would
387
Moreover, if the intervention does not
have likely been unsuccessful.
it is undertaken by a single state, the
and
approval
have Security Council
388
country must have made efforts to create a multinational force.
After the first large scale attack in 2013, Ms. Rice reiterated President Obama's plan, explaining the multiple attempts to resolve the Syri389
She stated that the
an crisis before a mass use of chemical weapons.
United States had consistently supported the U.N. diplomatic process to
talk to Syria and the formation of the United Nations Commission of
390
Inquiry to document the violence in Syria. She asserted that the United
States also publicly admonished Syria when it started using chemical
weapons on a very small scale a few months before the main attack and
39 1
provided evidence of the use to Congress and the United Nations.
Moreover, the United States provided non-lethal assistance to the civil
opposition and pushed for over six months for a U.N. team to visit Syria
392
to investigate the chemical weapons situation.

382.

See 2011 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, supra note 255.

383.

See id.
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Dana Bash et al., Trump on Syria's Assad: 'Something Should Happen,' CNN (Apr. 6,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/politics/donald-trump-syria-options/index.html.
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Three times the Security Council took up resolutions to condemn
lesser violence by the Syrian regime. Three times we negotiated for
weeks over the most watered-down language imaginable. And three
times, Russia and China doubled vetoed almost meaningless resolutions. Similarly, in the past two months, Russia has blocked two resolutions condemning the use of chemical weapons that did not even
ascribe blame to any party. Russia opposed two mere press statements expressing concern about their use. A week after the August
21 [2013] gas attack, the United Kingdom presented a resolution that
included a referral of war crimes in Syria to the International Criminal Court, but again the Russians opposed it, as they have every form
of accountability in Syria.3 9 3

When Syria acceded to the CWC, Russia assumed the role to oversee its ally's compliance and destruction or removal of its chemical
weapons stockpiles.3 94 By agreeing to permit Russia to serve as Syria's
supervisor, the United States made an accommodation to Syria as a com-

promise for not using force. When Syria launched its April 2017 attack,
Secretary Tillerson accused Russia of being either "complicit" or "incompetent" in carrying out its duties to ensure Syria's adherence to the

CWC. 39 5 Before launching a military strike, the United States could have
threatened to sanction Russia for its role in the attack and to pressure

Russia to compel Syria to halt its use of chemical weapons. The United
States also could have used economic sanctions to pressure President

Assad directly to give up the chemical weapons stockpile. The United
States currently maintains sanctions against Syria for its support of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction,396 but neither former President
Obama nor President Trump made any efforts to sanction Syria specifically for its use of chemical weapons. It can be argued, however, that

such sanctions against Russia or Syria would have had no real effect because history shows a lack of compliance and because the sanctions
could not literally destroy the stockpiles like a military strike would.
Under the ICISS theory explained above, evidence of the likelihood
of failure would be sufficient to rule out all conceivable options that were
393.

Id.

394.
See David Filipov & Anne Gearan, Russia Condemns U.S. Missile Strike on Syria, Suspends
Key
Air
Agreement,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
7,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-condemns-us-missile-strike-on-

syria/2017/04/07/c8leal2a-lb4e- lle7-8003-f55b4clcfae2_story.html.
395.
See Williams, supra note 17.
396.
The U.S. has placed sanctions on Syria but not any directly related to its use of chemical
weapons in August 2013. The sanctions include the Syria Accountability Act of 2004, which imposes sanctions on Syria for its support of terrorism, weapons of mass destructions programs, and its
role in Iraq. Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.

108-175, §§ 2(4)-(5), (20)22), (26)-(34), 117 Stat. 2482 (2003).

Another sanction is imposed against the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) and prohibits U.S. banks
from maintaining accounts with CBS. The final sanction is imposed on Syrian individuals and entities for their association with al Qaida, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden, involvement in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or receipt of any benefit from public corruption. See SYRIA
SANCTIONS PROGRAM, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL 4 (2013).
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not attempted. As a result, a U.S. military strike would be the last resort.
For years, the Obama Administration tried peace talks with Syria and
attempted to have U.N. resolutions passed. Though Syria ultimately
agreed to give up its chemical weapons stock, it did so only under this
U.S. threat of force. Moreover, the United States attempted to gain support and create a multinational force, as ICISS requires. British Prime
Minister David Cameron backed President Obama's plan, but the British
Parliament voted not to intervene, 397 based not on the legality of humani398
Given
tarian intervention but rather on the wisdom of such a mission.
take
would
States
United
the
that
warned
this history, Ambassador Haley
399
Acto
act.
action given the consistent failure of the United Nations
cordingly, President Trump's strike was a last resort.
5. Proportional Means
Any military intervention undertaken should be the minimum necessary to achieve the desired result of halting violence and protecting
people from suffering. 4 0 0 The scale, duration, and intensity should be
1
commensurate with the original provocation. 40 Any effect on the political system and structure of the targeted country must be limited to only
that intervention necessary. 402 For example, in 1914, two German officers and one German official were killed at an outpost in Portuguesecontrolled Angola.403 The Germans retaliated by destroying several Portuguese outposts.

40

4 The case's arbitrators found that the German retalia-

tion was greatly disproportionate to the instigation.

405

Another example is the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo.
Scholar John Janzekovic criticized NATO's seventy-eight-day air campaign as disproportionate to fight the decade-long slaughter of Kosovars
by the Serbs because it did not halt the killing.406 In fact, he argued, once
the air attacks began, the Serbs began a massive killing campaign of Kosovars. 4 07 About 100,000 Kosovars and only 8,000 Serbs were killed as a
result of the air campaign. 4 0 8 He asserted that NATO's strikes should
have been aimed at Serb forces instead of command and communications
397.
Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action, BBC (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783.
See Bethlehem, supra note 172.
398.

399.

Read Nikki Haley's Remarks About Syria at the U.N., TIME (Apr. 5, 2017),

http://time.com/4727499/nikki-haley-unsc-transcript-syria.
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systems, water and power supplies, and army and police barracks. 409 Accordingly, the attack was not proportionate to achieve the intended result. 4 10

Here, the Senate bill approving President Obama's plan stipulated
that the strike is for the "limited and specified" use of the armed forces in
Syria only to respond to the use of chemical weapons, deter Syria's use
of the weapons to protect the interests of the United States and its allies,
degrade Syria's capacity to use chemical weapons in the future, and prevent the transfer of the weapons to terrorist organizations. 411 Section III
of the bill explicitly limited the intervention: "[T]he authority granted ...
does not authorize U. S. Armed Forces ground combat operations in Syr,,412
ia.
President Obama explained that the military intervention would
have been very narrow.413 No soldiers would have been placed on the
ground, and it would have targeted the chemical weapons stockpiles to
deter their use generally and prevent Syria from using them again.414 The
strike would have been deliberately limited in time and scope,415 and it
would target the chemical weapons in a range of ways that would debilitate Syria's ability to manage, deliver, and develop chemical weapons.4 16
President Trump's missile launch was highly limited as it was
aimed at hangars, planes, fuel tank ammunition, storage, and air defense
systems.4 17 The strike was not intended to overthrow the Assad regime.
Secretary Rex Tillerson stated: "The process by which Assad would
leave is something that I think requires an international community effort."

4 18

6. Reasonable Prospects
A proposed military intervention must have some reasonable chance
of success without inflicting more harm than good.4 19 An intervening
state has a duty not to make the situation worse.420 In the United States,
409.

Id. at 54.

410.
411.

For further examples of proportionality issues, see id. at 54-55.
An Official Joint Resolution to Authorize Limited and Specified Use of the United States

Armed Forces Against Syria, S.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong.
412.
Id. § 3.

§ 2 (2013).

413.

Statement by the President on Syria, supranote 32.

414.

Id.

415.

Susan E. Rice, supra note 316.

416.

Id.

417.
Capaccio, Wadhams & Olorunnipa, supra note 385.
418.
Rex W. Tillerson, Sec'y of State, Remarks on China Summit (Apr. 6, 2017) (transcript
available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269540.htm).
419.
Scheffer, supra note 38, at 291.
420.
Brown, supra note 147, at 1735. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia launched a pre-investigation into NATO's intervention in Kosovo after allegations that its bombing campaign caused hundreds of deaths and great damage to the environment.
The Tribunal ultimately found that an in-depth investigation of the bombings was not necessary
because it was unlikely to find enough evidence to substantiate claims of human rights violations.
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domestic law imposes no duty upon a passer-by to intervene and provide
aid to someone in need.42 1 If the bystander chooses to intervene and inflicts more harm, however, that person may be held civilly liable. Hu422
manitarian intervention imposes a similar burden.42 If a state chooses to
423
intervene and does more damage, it has a duty to fix what it has done.
This type of responsibility acts as a deterrent to providing necessary
aid.424
Here, military action would be used as a deterrent, not to stop current fighting, so it would have to have a reasonable chance of success of
destroying the weaponry and deterring further use. President Obama's
plan was to destroy Syria's capacity to use chemical weapons in the fu425
President
ture and deter other dictators from employing them as well.
capaSyria's
destroy
Trump specifically fired at artillery and aircraft to
426
bility to spread these chemical gases.46 Eliminating the stockpile and
their modes of dissemination would have a reasonable chance of success
in achieving the stated goals because it would literally destroy the weaponry and make it impossible for President Assad to use those weapons
again. Of course, the strike would not eliminate the intellectual property
and human resources required to develop the weapons, but it is a start.
And it still sends a message to President Assad and other tyrants that the
international community will not tolerate their attempts to use these
weapons.
A chance exists, however, that a strike could do some harm.427 It

could potentially kill innocent civilians located in the vicinity of the
stockpiles, damage unrelated infrastructure, and perhaps even ignite
some chemical gases. 428 These types of harms are not minor, and they
must be prevented or minimized. But the question is not whether the
strike would cause any amount of harm; rather, the question is whether
the act would make the country's situation worse and inflict more harm
than good. While some harm is a possibility, based on the targeted nature
of the military strike, inadvertent damage was not great. Furthermore,
429
Prior to
steps were taken to ensure that minimal damage was done.
See INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMM. ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW
THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO

THE PROSECUTOR

¶ 90 (2000),

http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato06l300.pdf.
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Iraq, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (2005).
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President Trump's launch, the Pentagon informed Russia and also took
various measures to minimize the risk to Russian planes or personnel in
the airfield. 43 0 This damage would pale in comparison to the benefit of
ridding the world of a large stockpile of chemical weapons.
C. Responsibility to Rebuild
ICISS defined the responsibility to rebuild as the obligation "to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm
the intervention was designed to halt or avert."431 Without such assistance, countries are often left to deal with the underlying causes that initiated the conflict originally.432 Rebuilding involves committing additional funds and resources and may require the intervening country to
stay much longer than intended or desired.433
The most successful reconciliation processes do not necessarily occur
at high level political dialogue tables, or in judicial-style processes
(though we well understand the positive role that truth and reconciliation commissions can play in certain post-conflict environments).
True reconciliation is best generated by ground level reconstruction
efforts, when former armed adversaries join hands in rebuilding their
community or creating reasonable living and job conditions at new
settlements. True and lasting reconciliation occurs with sustained daily efforts at repairing infrastructure, at rebuilding housing, at planting
and harvesting, and cooperating in other productive activities. 434
In the 1998 U.N. report on the promotion of peace in Africa, the
Secretary-General described postconflict relief as follows: "Peacebuilding may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development.'A 35
ICISS lists three major areas during the rebuilding stage that require
attention: (1) security, (2) justice, and (3) economic development.436
First, security involves the protection of all nationals to prevent "reverse
ethnic cleansing" of victims against oppressors.437 Security also involves
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the reintegration of local police forces and disarmament of demobilized
soldiers.4 38 Second, measures ought to be taken to install or rehabilitate a
properly functioning justice system so that human rights violators can be
tried and punished. 439 These courts are the "first line of defence against
impunity"44 0 and are necessary to help citizens regain and protect rights,
such as property rights, that may have been unlawfully or physically destroyed. 44 1 Third, the intervening state should try to encourage economic
development and market growth.4 2 This includes helping eliminate any
economic sanctions that may have been imposed on the state during the
conflict.443
This rebuilding requirement is less of a legally imposed duty but rather a morally imposed one based on the basic premise of keeping promises.4 In the case of Kosovo, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair
recognized this responsibility when he stated at a press conference after
the NATO bombings, "[W]e said all the way through that we would help
them to reconstruct the Balkans, to make the Balkans a place of peace
and security. . . . Our job is to make sure that the promises that we made
445
to them during the course of the conflict we now honor post-conflict."
Further, in Libya, the Security Council adopted a resolution in September
2011 creating a U.N. support mission to help restore public security,
446
.
promote national reconciliation, and initiate economic recovery.
If the United States had intervened in Syria in 2013, it likely would
have provided rebuilding assistance as it has done in the past. Since the
United States invaded Libya, it has committed $170 million in aid and
has provided assistance to strengthen the election systems, justice sec7
tors, and various nongovernmental organizations' efforts." Further, the
United States has provided over $1 billion to Kosovo since 1999448 and
continues to provide assistance to develop the electoral system, agriculture and energy markets, and relationships between the Serbian majority
and the Government of Kosovo.

449

In this case, Secretary of State John

438.
439.

Id. 1 5.9.
Id. 15.13.

440.

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164,

441.

ICISS, supra note 37, 1 5.15.
Id. 5.19.
Id.

442.

443.

¶ 19.

Brown, supranote 147, at 1738.
444.
Remarks Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom and
445.
an Exchange with Reporters in Cologne, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1132, 1134 (June 18,

1999).
446.
447.

to

S.C. Res. 2009, 1 12 (Sept. 16, 2011).
Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle E. Transitions, U.S. Government Assistance

Libya

-

Fact

Sheet,

August

14,

2012,

RELIEFWEB

(Aug.4

2

14,

2012),

- 012.
http://reliefweb.int/report/libya/us-government-assistance-libya-fact-sheet-august-1
https://2001ST.,
DEP'T
U.S.
Kosovo,
to
Assistance
US.
448.

2009.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c26235.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO EuR. AND EURASIA, FOREIGN
449.
OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET (2013).

70

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1

Kerry announced on January 15, 2014, that the United States would provide an additional $380 million in humanitarian aid to the Syrian people,
bringing the total U.S. funding for humanitarian assistance to the Syrian
people to nearly $1.7 billion since the crisis began. 4 5 0 The aid included
food, clean water, shelter, medical care, and relief supplies to over 4.2
million people inside Syria and to more than 2 million refugees across
the region.4 51 President Obama also stated that the United States will
provide Jordan with $1 billion in loans to alleviate the strain of over
600,000 Syrian refugees.45 2
President Trump has stated that more aid would be provided to
countries like Jordan that are carrying the brunt of the refugees seeking
453
escape from Syria.
As of this writing, however, he has not made any
statements regarding specific plans for Syria, and thus it is unclear
whether President Trump will maintain the amount of aid President
Obama promised. If history is any indicator, however, it is likely that a
large amount of aid will still be provided, and thus the rebuilding prong
should be met.
CONCLUSION

Syria's use of chemical weapons against its own people is undeniably a violation of international law. As a member of the United Nations,
Syria was bound to uphold the values of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and as a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Syria
was prohibited from using chemical weapons. Moreover, the Chemical
Weapons Convention is almost universally agreed to, so Syria was bound
to those terms under customary international law.
The principles of nonintervention in the U.N. Charter should be preserved to maintain social and political order. But the terms of the Charter
also constrain nations that truly want to make a difference when human
rights atrocities occur. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the
responsibility to protect allow very narrow flexibility from the confines
of the Charter. While still developing, this emerging doctrine is a path-
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way to help ensure the safety and protection of innocent lives against
tyranny.
The United States, not only as a permanent member of the Security
Council but also as one of the most powerful nations in the world, is
poised to intervene when gross human rights violations occur. Though
the United States has not taken action in every instance of such violations, Syria provides a unique situation because the gravity of the crime
has massive implications for the security of the entire globe. Thus, the
United States and other nations should be able to intervene and fulfill
their responsibility to protect when acts, like the use of chemical weapons, show extreme disregard for and brutality against the innocent and
may be easily perpetrated across borders. As former President Obama
said:

*

[T]he moral thing to do is not to stand by and do nothing. I would
much rather spend my time talking about how every 3- and 4-yearold gets a good education than I would spending time thinking about
how I can prevent 3- and 4-year-olds from being subjected to chemical weapons and nerve gas. . .. I can't avoid those questions, because
as much as we are criticized, when bad stuff happens around the
world, the first question is, what is the United States going to do
454
about it?

President Trump called "on all civilized nations to join us in seeking
to end the slaughter and bloodshed in Syria . . .. [W]e hope that as long
as America stands for justice, that peace and harmony will, in the end,
prevail." 4 55 Too many times in history, the United Nations has ignored
456
It did so in
blaring warning signs about human rights violations4.
Rwanda, Cambodia, and the Balkans because of ambivalence or political
agendas. 457 "The United Nations and its Member States remain underprepared to meet their most fundamental prevention and protection responsibilities. We can, and must, do better. Humanity expects it and his458
tory demands it."
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